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The paper studies a learning model in which information about a worker’s ability can be
acquired symmetrically by the worker and a ﬁrm in any period by observing the worker’s perfor-
mance on a given task. Productivity at diﬀerent tasks is assumed to be diﬀerentially sensitive
to a worker’s intrinsic talent: potentially more proﬁtable tasks entail the risk of greater output
destruction if the worker assigned to them is not of the ability required. We characterize the
(essentially unique) optimal retention and task assignment policy for the class of sequential
equilibria of this game, by showing that the equilibria of interest are strategically equivalent to
the solution of an experimentation problem (a discounted multi-armed bandit with independent
and dependent arms). These equilibria are all ex ante eﬃcient but involve ex post ineﬃcient
task allocation and separation. While the ex post ineﬃciency of separations persists even as the
time horizon becomes arbitrarily large, in the limit task assignment is eﬃcient. When ability
consists of multiple skills, low performing promoted workers are ﬁred rather than demoted, if
outcomes at lower level tasks, compared to those at higher level tasks, provide a suﬃciently
accurate measure of ability. We then examine the strategic eﬀects of the dynamics of learning
on a worker’s career proﬁle. We prove, in particular, that price competition among ﬁrms causes
ex ante ineﬃcient turnover and task assignment, independently of the degree of transferability
of human capital. In a class of equilibria of interest it generates a wage dynamics consistent
with properties observed in the data.
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11 Introduction
An issue ﬁrms face, when allocating employees to jobs, is how workers can be made to perform
diﬀerent tasks in a way that does not create competition in their attention, if a ﬁrm values these
tasks as complementary. In the principal-agent literature examples of this are the trade-oﬀ between
quantity and quality in output production or between teaching of basic and higher order thinking
skills in education (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom [1991]). These models commonly interpret job design
as an instrument to control incentives in presence of moral hazard. An alternative approach, which
will be suggested in the following, is to interpret instead job and career design as a problem of
optimal design of experiment. When agents’ productive characteristics are not perfectly observable,
jobs can be valuable as a source of information for the principal. In particular, complementarity of
tasks in terms of information production can be as relevant as their complementarity in terms of
output production.
When a ﬁrm assigns a newly hired worker to a position, it frequently does not know with
certainty his ability and attitude to the various jobs. Then, allocating an employee a given task
entails an opportunity cost in terms of the foregone proﬁt at an alternative task, at which the
employee might be more productive if he is talented for that job. A young investment banker or
consultant, for instance, can always be made to carry out an easy task (i.e., provide support to
senior workers on routine duties) at which performance can be easily monitored, but the ability
the ﬁrm is typically uncertain about is related to the worker’s productivity at other tasks, such
as elaborating a restructuring project for a client or increasing the ﬁrm’s managed portfolio, for
which monitoring is less accurate and outcomes more variable. Indeed, the accomplishment of these
richer tasks, with a greater impact on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt, commonly requires the participation of other
workers (i.e., a consultancy project is a typical team activity) and success is usually inﬂuenced
by factors outside the worker’s immediate control (i.e., the demand for the ﬁrm’s services or the
current phase of business cycle). In this case the ﬁrm thus faces a trade-oﬀ between observing the
worker’s performance at a more informative task, less proﬁtable if the worker’s ability is high, and
assigning him immediately a more proﬁtable task, which might generate a loss for the ﬁrm if the
worker is not talented for that job.
The interpretation we will provide to the way personnel policies solve this trade-oﬀ is that, when
jobs aﬀect the ﬁrm’s information about workers’ abilities, the change in a worker’s task assignment
over his career can be understood as the outcome of a sequential screening process. In particular,
as suggested by Holmstr¨ om and Tirole [1989], in presence of uncertainty about workers’ productive
characteristics, the ﬁrm’s allocation problem cannot be reduced to “match[ing] workers with jobs
in a myopic fashion based on currently available information, but [it] also [requires] to consider the
2implications of current assignments on what might be learned for the beneﬁt of future assignments”.
This endogenous process of information acquisition on the part of the ﬁrm, as hinted, has to balance
the proﬁt loss the ﬁrm might incur, if a worker is assigned a task at which he is ill-suited, with
the beneﬁt of acquiring new information, if the worker’s performance at that task is suﬃciently
informative about his ability. This situation, therefore, creates a tension for the ﬁrm between the
objective of proﬁt-maximization and the need for experimentation, by trying a worker at diﬀerent
jobs in order to learn about his productivity. As a result, retention, task assignment and promotion
policies can be naturally characterized as the optimal solution to a sequential design problem, in
a precise statistical sense, with the ﬁrm experimenting on workers’ ability by employing them at
diﬀerent tasks.
Abstracting from incentive issues, the focus of the paper is on how informational concerns can
account for certain aspects of job design, in particular for the existence of stable patterns of career
advancements in ﬁrms (i.e., a hierarchy or ‘job ladder’, with workers moving along it as their tenure
at a ﬁrm increases). One of the insights from the analysis is that, when talent is correlated across
tasks, a ﬁrm typically beneﬁts by assigning a worker, early in his career, a task at which he has a
static comparative disadvantage, if that task provides accurate information about his productivity.
In particular, even if workers of diﬀerent skills have diﬀerent patterns of comparative advantage
across tasks, the possibility of drawing more accurate inferences about ability can be valuable
enough for the ﬁrm to justify assigning a worker a task at which he is expected to generate a loss.
Since, as time passes, the ﬁrm has more and more chances to observe the worker’s performance,
eventually the worker will be either permanently retained, and assigned the task for which he is
most talented, or ﬁred, if his ability is perceived to be inadequate for the ﬁrm’s needs.
An intuition for why this screening procedure is optimal is that, even if tasks are intertempo-
rally substitutes in terms of output production, information on performance at diﬀerent tasks is
complementary from a dynamic perspective: observing a worker’s performance at one task can be
useful in assessing his ability at other tasks. We will show then that the existence of this infor-
mational link makes it proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to assign tasks sequentially in order of decreasing
informativeness, with easier-to-monitor tasks assigned ﬁrst and harder-to-measure task allocated
only when uncertainty about ability has been partially resolved.1
Formally, the model features one ﬁrm which, in each period of an inﬁnite horizon, is at most
matched with one worker, whose ability can be either ‘high’ or ‘low’. Both the ﬁrm and the worker
1Note that this intuition contrasts with the conclusion from multitask incentive models with risk averse agents. In
those, in fact, separating among workers tasks at which measurement errors are correlated is optimal, since it reduces
the risk premium incurred in providing incentives. In presence of uncertainty, instead, it is exactly this correlation,
and its impact on the process of inference about ability, to make sequential assignment proﬁtable.
3do not observe the worker’s ability and are risk neutral; for the ﬁrm, though, it is only proﬁtable
to employ a high ability worker. Once employed, a worker supplies eﬀort inelastically, which is
observed by the ﬁrm and determines a stochastic output signal, whose distribution depends on
the worker’s actual ability and on the task he is assigned. The output realization in a period,
being public, can then be used by the ﬁrm and the worker to draw inferences about the worker’s
unobserved productivity.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which only one task is available. Given this informational structure,
the ﬁrm’s decision problem can be interpreted as a two-armed bandit problem, in which the arm
associated with employing the worker in a period delivers a stochastic reward, while the arm
represented by the ﬁrm’s outside option generates a known proﬁt.2 The ﬁrm’s optimal strategy
in this framework is a reservation-belief strategy, with the worker being employed by the ﬁrm as
long as its updated belief about the worker’s productivity exceeds a cut-oﬀ value, endogenously
determined, and dismissed (forever) otherwise. Under this optimal strategy a worker of high ability
has (at least) the same probability of being retained at the ﬁrm as a low ability worker. Still, as
the time horizon becomes arbitrarily large, a high ability worker is retained forever with strictly
positive probability, while a low ability worker is ﬁred almost surely. Then, the ﬁrm typically
risks ﬁring a high ability worker even if it is potentially allowed to sample an inﬁnite number of
observations. This incompleteness in the ﬁrm’s learning about a worker’s ability, characteristic of
experimentation models, is due to the fact that, even in the long run, with positive probability
the ﬁrm can observe a sequence of mediocre performances suﬃciently long to convince it that the
worker’s ability is low, even if he is truly of high productivity.
To analyze the impact of learning on job assignment and career design, we then explore the
case in which, once employed, a worker can be assigned one of two diﬀerent tasks, either task y or
task z.3 Analogously to the above, in all the sequential equilibria of the task-assignment game the
ﬁrm’s best response can be characterized as the solution to a three-armed bandit problem, with two
dependent arms (task y and task z), being ability correlated across them, and one independent arm,
corresponding to the ﬁrm’s outside option. Suppose that a low ability worker has a comparative
advantage at task z while a high ability worker at task y, but that the ﬁrm prefers to collect its
outside option rather than to employ a low ability worker. Then, if task z is more informative about
a worker’s productivity than task y (i.e., the distribution of the ﬁrm’s posterior that the worker’s
ability is high under task z is a mean-preserving spread of the corresponding distribution under
task y), the ﬁrm’s optimal employment strategy is a belief-interval strategy, under which a worker
2It can be interpreted, for instance, as the value of re-sampling a worker.
3The two task case is explored in the paper for expositional simplicity. The extension to a ﬁnite number of tasks
preserves all the results of interest.
4is assigned task z as long as the ﬁrm’s posterior lies in an intermediate belief range. If the ﬁrm’s
posterior is suﬃciently high, the worker is thus allocated task y, while a worker whose assessed
ability is relatively low is permanently ﬁred. In particular, the option of experimenting across
multiple tasks has the beneﬁt of reducing the probability that a high ability worker is eventually
ﬁred. More speciﬁcally, by assigning a newly hired worker task z when most uncertain about his
ability, the ﬁrm can reduce the limiting likelihood of a type II error, i.e., dismissing forever a high
ability worker, without increasing the likelihood of a type I error, i.e., retaining forever a low ability
worker.
We then investigate the case in which ability consists of two dimensions of skill. Suppose, for
instance, that good performance at either task requires a speciﬁc and independent dimension of
skill, but, say, task z is equally informative about ability at z and y, while task y is less informative
than z about the talent required to perform satisfactorily at y. In this context it can be shown
that the information collected by observing the worker’s performance at task z can help reduce
the ﬁrm’s uncertainty about a worker’s overall skill and, therefore, make its use proﬁtable, even
if a newly hired worker is always more proﬁtable at z than at y. In this scenario an endogenous
grouping of tasks into job levels emerges. As a consequence, in contrast with the one-dimensional
ability case, if a worker performs unsatisfactorily at task y, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ by ﬁring him than
assigning him back the more informative task. The intuition for this result is that a worker whose
performance is revealed unsuccessful at a higher level task, at which production outcomes are not
very informative, must be even less likely to be proﬁtable at a lower level task, if performance
measures at the two tasks are correlated. Notice that this ﬁnding can help explaining the empirical
puzzle that promoted workers are more likely to be ﬁred than demoted, as documented, for instance,
by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstr¨ om [1994a].
The above results overall oﬀer an interpretation of career advancements alternative to the Peter
Principle: workers are not necessarily promoted to their level of incompetence, as the principle
states, but rather gradually assigned to the positions at which they can best contribute to a ﬁrm’s
value. Namely, they are promoted to their level of perceived competence. In particular, a good
record at a current job eﬃciently supports promotion to a diﬀerent job, even when a ﬁrm does
not need to provide workers with incentives for performance. This feature is in stark contrast with
the result familiar from bandit problems (i.e., each arm is informative only about the type of the
arm being played), according to which a worker should be continuously assigned to the same job as
long as his performance at it is good, when information about ability at diﬀerent tasks is generated
independently.4
4It is the well-known result of the stay-on-the-winner characteristic of the optimal policy in independent bandit
problems.
5We ﬁnally show that the same characterization results hold in presence of price competition in
the external labor market. By an argument similar to the one used by Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki
[1996], it is in fact possible to show that the eﬃcient experimentation solution can be characterized
as the solution to the employment problem of a single ﬁrm, in which the worker’s outside option is
normalized to zero. In this case turnover is typically ineﬃcient and the ineﬃciency is independent
of the degree of task- or ﬁrm-speciﬁcity of a worker’s human capital.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline multitask model and
presents the main results. Section 3 explores the case in which ability consists of multiple skills,
while Section 4 adresses the issue of outside labor market competition. Section 5 illustrates the
relevant related literature. Finally, Section 6 brieﬂy concludes and discusses possible extensions of
the model, as well as directions of future research.
2 A Two Task Model
Consider a ﬁrm that employs one worker. Time is discrete and has an inﬁnite horizon, with dates
t = 1;2;:::. The worker’s productivity µ is unobserved to both the ﬁrm and the worker, with
support fµ;µg, µ > µ. The ﬁrm and the worker’ prior distribution over the worker’s productivity is
Pr(µ) = 1 ¡ ¼ and Pr(µ) = Á0, Á0 2 (0;1). In every period of employment the worker inelastically
supplies one unit of (observable and veriﬁable) eﬀort, which determines output according to the
task the worker is assigned.6 In particular, if the worker performs task y, his output in period t is
yt = fy;yg, y > y > 0, distributed according to the conditional density Pr(˜ yt = y j µ = µ) = ®1
and Pr(˜ yt = y j µ = µ) = ¯1, with ®1;¯1 2 (0;1) and ®1 > ¯1. If, instead, the worker is assigned
task z, his output is zt = fz;zg, z > z > 0, with conditional density Pr(˜ zt = z j µ = µ) = ®2
and Pr(˜ zt = z j µ = µ) = ¯2, where ®2;¯2 2 (0;1) and ®2 > ¯2. It is assumed that yt and zt are
observable to the ﬁrm and the worker.
If employed at date t the worker receives from the ﬁrm a payment wt. Correspondingly, the
ﬁrm’s realized payoﬀ at the end of period t is yt ¡ wt or zt ¡ wt, depending on the task performed
by the worker, while the worker’s is wt. Notice that the worker’s disutility of eﬀort is normalized
to zero. The ﬁrm’s reservation proﬁt is given by Π ¸ 0, while the worker’s reservation utility by
5An empirical estimation of job and wage dynamics is carried out in a companion paper using the same ﬁrm-level
dataset ﬁrst used in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstr¨ om [1994a, 1994b].
6Note that the veriﬁability of output only matters for the case in which ability is private information to the
worker. It is possible to show that, under limited liability, if output is nonveriﬁable and the distance between the two
type-dependent outside options not too small, nonveriﬁability prevents the use of revelation schemes and the same
characterization results as for the symmetric learning case hold.
6U ¸ 0. Let
(A1) : y(µ) > Π + U
(A2) : y(µ) > z(µ); z(µ) > y(µ)
where y(µ) ´ E(y j µ) and z(µ) ´ E(z j µ) denote, respectively, the one period expected revenue
to the ﬁrm from assigning the worker task z or task y. Let also y(Á) ´ Áy(µ) + (1 ¡ Á)y(µ) and
z(Á) ´ Áz(µ)+(1¡Á)z(µ). Notice that (A2) is satisﬁed whenever the distribution of output under
task z is generated through a mean-preserving decrease in the spread of the probability mass of the
cumulative density function of y, for each µ, with y < z and y > z. The assumption is meant to
capture the feature that ability is more valuable at activities which can in principle contribute more
to the ﬁrm’s value or, equivalently, that the incremental impact of ability is greater at potentially
more proﬁtable tasks. The restriction also implies that task y entails the risk of greater output
destruction if the worker assigned to it is not of the ability required. Both the ﬁrm and the worker
discount future payoﬀs according to a common discount factor ± 2 [0;1).
Timing is as follows. At the beginning of any period t ¸ 1 the ﬁrm decides whether to propose
employment to the worker at wage wt. Wage oﬀers are made by the ﬁrm on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. If in a period the ﬁrm does not make a proposal or the worker rejects the ﬁrm’s oﬀer, both the
ﬁrm and the worker receive their reservation payoﬀs. They then meet again the following period.
If the worker accepts the ﬁrm’s oﬀer, he is assigned a task and eﬀort at this task stochastically
determines output yt or zt. Finally, the wage wt is paid.
Let H =
S
t¸1 Ht represent the set of all the possible histories and Ht the set of the period-t
histories (up to but not including period t). An element ht of Ht contains all the past wage oﬀers,
w¿, 1 · ¿ < t, the worker’s acceptance decisions, d¿, 1 · ¿ < t, his task assignments, j¿ 2 fy;zg,
1 · ¿ < t, and the random realizations of output, k¿ 2 fy¿;z¿g, 1 · ¿ < t. Hence, an element ht
of Ht, t ¸ 2, is given by
ht = (w1;d1;j1;k1;:::;wt¡1;dt¡1;jt¡1;kt¡1)
with H1 = f;g and, for 1 · ¿ < t,
k¿(j¿) =
(
k¿(y) 2 fy;yg; if j¿ = y
k¿(z) 2 fz;zg; if j¿ = z:
A pure strategy for the ﬁrm in period t is given by the function !t, which determines the compen-
sation oﬀered to the worker, and the function et, which deﬁnes the worker’s task assignment in the
period. The function !t maps the history into the positive real numbers or the empty set (the ﬁrm
7has always the possibility of not oﬀering employment)
!t : Ht ! R [ f;g
with wt 2 R[f;g. The function et, describing the ﬁrm’s task assignment decision, maps the history
and the ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer into the task space fy;zg,
et : Ht £ R ! fy;zg
with jt 2 fy;zg. A pure strategy for the worker in period t is a function from the history and the
ﬁrm’s current wage oﬀer into the decision space fA;Rg, with A denoting the worker’s acceptance
of the ﬁrm’s oﬀer while R his refusal,
at : Ht £ R ! fA;Rg
where dt 2 fA;Rg.
Given the existence of symmetric uncertainty about the worker’s ability, let the ﬁrm’s and the
worker’s posterior belief at the beginning of date t ¸ 2 that the worker’s ability is µ be denoted
by Át, with Á1 ´ ¼. In order to focus the equilibrium analysis on the strategic eﬀects of the ﬁrm’s
learning, we restrict attention to Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE’s) of the game for which Át is the
state variable. In this framework a strategy is Markovian if it depends on the past only through
the payoﬀ relevant history as summarized by Át. Stationary MPE strategies are MPE strategies
which are time-invariant. In any MPE the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt, the worker maximizes utility, the
ﬁrm and the worker’s expectations about the worker’s ability are correct and they use Bayes’ rule
to update their posteriors about the worker’s productivity. Let Á (omitting the subscript t) be then
the state variable of the corresponding complete information game (continue).
Apart from issues of sequential rationality, non-Markovian equilibria, typically in trigger strate-
gies, involve a degree of coordination between the ﬁrm’s and the worker’s behavior which ignores
the screening value of early periods of employment. On the contrary, since diﬀerent job positions
require speciﬁc qualiﬁcations and skills which are diﬃcult to assess in newly hired workers, the value
of the match to both parties is typically identiﬁed only after the worker has been employed for some
time.7 In the following, therefore, we rule out these equilibria by requiring the parties’ behavior
to be Markovian. In our symmetric learning framework, though, the restriction to Markovian
strategies is without loss of generality. As it will be shown, given the worker’s acceptance behav-
ior, the ﬁrm’s uniquely optimal employment strategies (modulo the way indiﬀerence is solved) are
Markovian, i.e., all sequential equilibria are stationary MPE’s as deﬁned.
7Indeed, evaluating ability in young employees appears to be a major force shaping ﬁrms’ personnel policies. See,
for a reference, Milgrom and Roberts [1992].
8Given the structure of the game between the ﬁrm and the worker, in equilibrium the ﬁrm’s
wage oﬀer must exactly match the worker’s reservation utility. Intuitively, any wage higher than U
would only decrease the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, since it does not aﬀect the probability of realization of a high
output: by paying U, the ﬁrm can always ensure the worker’s participation. On the other hand, a
wage payment strictly lower than U would discourage a worker from accepting the ﬁrm’s oﬀer, given
that the ﬁrm cannot credibly promise to pay more than U in a period. In particular, accepting
any oﬀer at least equal to U is for a worker a dominant strategy. This observation motivates the
following:
Lemma 1. In any MPE the ﬁrm’s cost-minimizing wage policy consists in paying the worker the
wage U for any period of employment.
In order to investigate the informational value of experimenting a worker at diﬀerent tasks, as
a benchmark we ﬁrst consider the case in which the ﬁrm can only allocate the worker task y.
2.1 The One Task Case
If only task y is available, assumptions (A1) and (A2) read as
(A1') : y(µ) > Π + U > y(µ):
For ﬁxed wage policy (and worker’s acceptance behavior), the ﬁrm’s problem in any period reduces
to deciding whether or not to employ the worker at wage U. Since the worker’s productive ability
is unknown, an employment strategy that yields the highest total expected proﬁt can be char-
acterized as the solution to an independent one-armed bandit problem. The term bandit derives
from modelling this class of sequential decision problems as an n-armed bandit, n ¸ 1, or a slot
machine with n arms, each generating rewards according to one of a ﬁnite number of distributions
(the types of the arm). Independence refers to the fact that each arm is only informative about its
unknown type. Speciﬁcally, at each point in time the ﬁrm’s decision is between the stochastic arm
(i.e., employing the worker), which generates rewards according to a Bernoulli distribution with
probability of success ® or ¯, or playing the deterministic arm (i.e., not employing the worker),
which delivers the constant reservation proﬁt Π.
Observe ﬁrst that, given the informational structure of the problem and the equilibrium restric-
tion, an optimal strategy for the ﬁrm (i.e., a wage proposal strategy which is a best response to
the workers’s acceptance behavior) must be one in which, whenever the ﬁrm does not employ the
worker in a period, it will never employ him in any subsequent period. Equivalently, in our envi-
ronment separations can only be permanent.8 The argument goes as follows. If the ﬁrm employs
8This feature seems consistent with the observed ﬁnding that in human capital intensive sectors like ﬁnance,
9the worker for t¡1 periods, at the beginning of period t it has to decide whether to employ him for
at least one additional period. If it chooses not to, the ﬁrm obtains a ﬂow payoﬀ of Π, but it does
not receive any additional information about the worker’s ability. Therefore, if the ﬁrm’s belief at
date t is such that not employing the worker is optimal, the same choice must be optimal at t + 1,
given that the belief is unchanged. The ﬁrm’s hiring problem in a generic period t can then be
described by the value function
V (Á) = maxfΠ;Vy(Á)g = maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U] + ±EyV (Á)g: (1)
Payoﬀs are normalized so as to be expressed as per period averages. Properties of V f are summa-
rized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Under assumption (A1’):
(i) V (Á) is well-deﬁned, continuous, increasing and convex in Á.
(ii) V (0) = Π and V (1) = y(µ) ¡ U = ®1y + (1 ¡ ®1)y ¡ U.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Since y(Á) is strictly increasing in Á and V (Á) increasing, the right-hand side of (1) is strictly
increasing in Á. From this, together with (A1’) and (A2’), it follows that there exists a unique
value ˜ Áy 2 (0;1) satisfying Π = Vy(Á). This implies that the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy consists in
employing the worker in a period, if the resulting present expected discounted proﬁt exceeds the
value of the ﬁrm’s outside option or, equivalently, if Á ¸ ˜ Áy. A part for the speciﬁcation of the
wage oﬀered when Á < ˜ Áy (any oﬀer w(Á) < U is payoﬀ-equivalent given that it induces refusal on
the part of the worker), this strategy is essentially the ﬁrm’s uniquely optimal one, for given prior
belief ¼. More formally:
Proposition 1. Let (A1’) hold. Then:
(i) A strategy proﬁle (!¤;a¤) is an MPE if and only if
!¤(Á) =
(




A; w ¸ U
R; otherwise
where w0 2 [0;U), together with beliefs determined according to Bayes’ rule.
(ii) All MPE’s are payoﬀ-equivalent to both parties and constrained Pareto eﬃcient.
(iii) Every MPE is outcome equivalent to some sequential equilibrium.
insurance and real estate, temporary layoﬀs are relatively rare, as compared, for instance, with manufacturing. For
a reference, see Anderson and Meyer [1994]. In our framework, though, separations are always initiated by the ﬁrm.
10Proof: (i) By Lemma 1, given the ﬁrm’s proposal strategy and the common belief about the
worker’s ability, the worker maximizes utility by accepting any (and only) a wage oﬀer at least
equal to U for any Á. For given Á, by the above argument the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by oﬀering
the worker the wage U when Á ¸ ˜ Áy and a wage strictly less than U otherwise. Given the output
realization in a period, the ﬁrm and the worker update their beliefs about the worker’s ability using
Bayes’ rule. (ii) Notice ﬁrst that any other equilibrium strategy proﬁle in which the ﬁrm’s oﬀer
is less than U, when Á < ˜ Áy, achieves the same payoﬀ, given the worker’s acceptance behavior.
Consider now the case of non-stationary strategies. Observe that, by the argument in Lemma 1,
there cannot be any equilibrium in which the ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer is greater than U for some Á. The
only admissible MPE’s in non-stationary strategies are therefore those in which, whenever Á < ˜ Áy,
the ﬁrm chooses to oﬀer a wage less than U, possibly diﬀerent from period to period. Again, all
these MPE are payoﬀ-equivalent. Given the worker’s acceptance behavior and, correspondingly, the
ﬁrm’s equilibrium wage strategy, proﬁt maximization is equivalent to surplus maximization. Finally,
(iii) by the equivalence between the original non-Markovian problem and the Markovian stochastic
dynamic programming problem (with state space given by the set of probability distribution over
Θ), it is possible to restrict attention to the the solution of the problem in recursive form.
Intuitively, for the ﬁrm to be willing to employ the worker in a period, the corresponding one-
period proﬁt must be at least equal to Π, if the ﬁrm ignores the beneﬁt of the additional information
about the worker’s ability generated by his performance. This implies that the value of the belief for
which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between employing and not employing the worker must be higher when
the ﬁrm acts myopically (for ± = 0) than when it internalizes the informational gain associated with
observing the worker’s output in a period. As a result, the ﬁrm’s optimal employment strategy is
an experimentation strategy, i.e., the ﬁrm (eﬃciently, as shown) trade-oﬀs in expected terms the
current period proﬁt from employing the worker against the beneﬁt of improving on its assessment
about the worker’s productivity. In particular, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to employ the worker even
when he is expected to generate a one-period loss. Formally, deﬁne Ám;y to be the (unique) value
of the posterior belief for which a myopic ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between oﬀering and not oﬀering the
worker employment. Let ˜ V f(Á) be the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ when it behaves myopically. The following
Proposition can then be proved:
Proposition 2. Let (A1’) hold and Ám;y satisfy ˜ V (Ám;y) = Π. Then, Ám;y > ˜ Áy.
Proof: See the Appendix.
By solving period by period an informationally constrained Pareto problem, the ﬁrm induces
employment only when ex ante eﬃcient. A consequence of separation being ex ante eﬃcient is
11that the ﬁrm can not beneﬁt by contracting on the worker’s participation for more than one period
(short-term contracting). By committing to employ the worker for a ﬁxed number of periods at
wage U, the ﬁrm can at most replicate the outcome of the optimal experimentation strategy, since,
by the principle of optimality, it is the optimal strategy among the class of all (Markovian and non-
Markovian) commitment and non-commitment strategies.9 A fortiori, no long-term contract can
improve on a random sequence of spot contracts when only participation is contractible. Therefore:
Corollary 1. Under assumptions (A1’), any optimal long-term contract is equivalent to the random
sequence of spot contracts associated with the corresponding MPE.
Notice, though, that MPE’s are typically ex post ineﬃcient. The above characterization results
imply that, after observing a history along which few high output signals have realized, it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to ﬁre the worker. In particular, even when the worker is of high productivity, the ﬁrm
may employ him only a ﬁnite number of periods, if it becomes suﬃciently pessimistic about his
talent. Indeed, as it will be shown, histories that induce the ﬁrm to believe it is employing a low
ability worker, despite the worker’s productivity being high, have strictly positive probability even
when the time horizon becomes arbitrarily large.
2.1.1 Tenure and the Dynamics of Learning
To ensure that it is always proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to hire the worker in the ﬁrst period, given the
common belief ¼ that his ability is µ, assume
(A2') : ¼ > ˜ Áy:
The sequence of output realizations observed in equilibrium can be interpreted as the outcome of
consecutive Bernoulli trials, with probability of success equal to ®, if the worker’s ability is high,
or ¯, if the worker’s ability is low. Accordingly, the cardinality of a history ht, c(ht), denotes the
number of realizations of high output along it and can be expressed as c(ht) =
Pt¡1
¿=1 1¿, where
1¿ 2 f0;1g is the indicator function of a success (high output) in period ¿. Since the signal yt is
exchangeable, the belief Á is then just a function of the total number of high output signals realized
up to time t ¡ 1, regardless of their order. As such, it is increasing in c(ht).
To analyze the impact of learning on the worker’s tenure, deﬁne ½t(µ) to be the probability that
a worker of type µ is continuously employed by the ﬁrm at least until period t.10 Notice that the
9See, for instance, Hinderer [1970] for a formal argument.
10The discussion in the present Subsection builds on an analogous argument in Araujo and Camargo [2002]. I am
indebted to Braz Camargo for pointing me out the similarity.
12ﬁrm’s retention rule Á ¸ ˜ Áy can be expressed equivalently in terms of the cardinality of the period-t






















The ﬁrm, then, continues to employ the worker at least until period t as long as a history h¿ with
cardinality c¿¡1 ´ c(h¿) ¸ b¸(¿ ¡ 1) ¡ °c realizes, where 2 · ¿ · t. Since, by assumption (A3’), a
worker is always employed in period 1, ½1(µ) = 1. The probability that a worker of type µ will still
be employed at the beginning of period 2 is given by the probability that a history with cardinality





with p(µ) = ®1 and p(µ) = ®2. Proceeding similarly, the probability that a worker of type µ will






Ct¡1 = f(c1;:::;ct¡1) : c¿ ¸ b¸¿ ¡ °c ¡ c1 ¡ ::: ¡ c¿¡1; for¿ = 1;:::;t ¡ 1g:
Proposition 3 summarizes the properties of a worker’s tenure prospect at the ﬁrm.
Proposition 3. Let (A1’)-(A2’) hold. Then, for all t, ½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ) · ½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ). In
particular, ½t(µ) · ½t(µ). Moreover, for all ° there exists a t such that, for all t > t, these
inequalities are strict.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Even if the probability of retention of any type of worker is decreasing over time, its decrease
is higher for a low type worker: the probability that a worker is ﬁred exactly after t periods of
employment, ½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ), is higher for a low than for a high ability worker. This follows from
the fact that a worker is dismissed only after the ﬁrm has observed a suﬃciently long sequence of
low output realizations, leading it to believe that the worker is of low productivity. This evidence,
in turn, is more likely to occur when the worker’s actual ability is low rather than high. Therefore,
11The symbol b¢c denotes the greatest integer lower than the indicated number.
13at any point in time the prospect of retention is more favorable for a worker of type µ than for a
worker of type µ.
The bandit structure of the ﬁrm’s problem has further implications for a worker’s tenure in
the long run. It is immediate to see that the Bernoulli distribution governing output realizations
satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property (MRLP) for ®1 > ®2. Suppose to order the types
of an arm in terms of their expected one-period return. In independent bandit problems the best
type of an arm, which becomes optimal at some point in time, will survive forever and continuously
with strictly positive probability (see Banks and Sundaram [1992a]).12 In our model this amounts
to the fact that the ex ante probability of permanent tenure of a high ability worker (i.e., the ‘best
type’ of the stochastic arm) is strictly positive. In this framework, in addition, the ﬁrm will always
be able to screen out a low ability worker in the limit.
The characteristics of the ﬁrm’s experimentation process have therefore diﬀerent implications
for the average duration of employment of workers of diﬀerent productivity. In particular, while
a worker of low productivity is expected to be employed only a ﬁnite number of periods, a high
ability worker experiences on average permanent tenure at the ﬁrm. More formally, deﬁne pt+1;t(µ)
to be the probability that a worker of type µ, who has been continuously employed by the ﬁrm for
at least t periods, will be employed at least for an additional period. Let T(µ) indicate the random
length of tenure at the ﬁrm of a worker of productivity µ and E1[T(µ)] the expected value of T(µ)
at the beginning of period 1. Then:
Proposition 4. Under assumptions (A1’)-(A2’) the following results hold:
(i) limt!1 ½t(µ) = 0, while 0 < limt!1 ½t(µ) = ½ < 1.
(ii) limt!1 pt+1;t(µ) = 1.
(iii) E1[T(µ)] < 1 and E1[T(µ)] = 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
As illustrated by Aghion, Bolton, Harris and Jullien [1991], as long as the ﬁrm does not know
all the relevant aspects of its objective function, when deciding which action to choose it has to
balance two conﬂicting objectives, the maximization of the informational content of the choice of
the current action, on one hand, and the maximization of its expected current period proﬁt, on the
other. Since suﬃcient information about the unknown parameters of interest is needed to select
the appropriate arm, the optimal experimentation strategy can be interpreted as adjusting the
myopic strategy (i.e., the one which maximizes the one-period expected reward) by allowing for
12Notice that, in the absence of MLRP, the problem of identifying in the limit an arm of the best type is not trivial,
since the best type of an arm may last only ﬁnitely long with probability one (Example 5.1 in Banks and Sundaram
[1992a]).
14active experimentation as long as it is proﬁtable (i.e., for Á ¸ ˜ Áy). The fact that this trade-oﬀ does
not disappear in the long run is the source of the incompleteness in the ﬁrm’s limiting learning:
for a suﬃciently long sequence of low output realizations, even a high ability worker risks being
permanently ﬁred. This is also the rationale behind separations being ex post ineﬃcient even in
the long run: the ﬁrm does not necessarily know the worker’s true level of productivity when it is
optimal for it to ﬁre him, even if, were the ﬁrm to sample an inﬁnite number of output observations,
its estimate about µ would eventually converge to its true value.
2.2 The Two Task Case
Consider now the case in which both tasks y and z are available. By the same argument as in
Lemma 1 the cost-minimizing wage policy for the ﬁrm is to pay the worker the wage U in each
period. Since, similarly to the above, under the Markovian restriction on equilibrium behavior not
employing the worker is an absorbing state, the ﬁrm’s value function can be expressed as
V (Á) =maxfΠ;Vz(Á);Vy(Á)g
maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á) ¡ U] + ±EzV (Á);(1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U] + ±EyV (Á)g: (2)
For ﬁxed ﬁrm’s and worker’s strategy, E denotes the (conditional) expectation over the period-t+1
value of the ﬁrm’s posterior, given the period-t value of Á and the worker’s current task assignment.
When the ﬁrm does not employ the worker, its (normalized) present expected discounted proﬁt is
Π. When, instead, employment takes place, its ﬂow (normalized) proﬁt is (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á) ¡ U] or
(1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U], depending on the task the worker performs. The ﬁrm then faces the same
decision problem in the next period, with posterior belief determined according to Bayes’ rule.
Lemma 3. Under assumptions (A1)-(A2):
(i) V (Á) is well-deﬁned and continuous, increasing and convex in Á.
(ii) V (0) = Π and V (1) = y(µ) ¡ U = ®1y + (1 ¡ ®1)y ¡ U.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that y(Á) and z(Á) are strictly increasing in Á. Since V (Á) is increasing in Á, it follows
that both the (normalized) present expected discounted values from employing the worker at task
z and y are strictly increasing in Á. Moreover, from the fact that (1¡±)[z(µ)¡U]+±[y(µ)¡U] > Π
and Π > (1 ¡ ±)[z(µ) ¡ U] + ±Π, it follows that there exists a unique value Á¤
z 2 (0;1) satisfying
Π = Vz(Á). As it will be shown in Proposition 5, Á¤
z equals ˜ Áz, where ˜ Áz is deﬁned as the threshold
belief value for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between employing and not employing the worker when
15only task z is available (and ˜ Vz is the corresponding value function).13 Denote this common value
of Á¤
z and ˜ Áz by Á¤. We will prove in the following that there also exists an interior threshold belief
value Á¤¤, with Á¤¤ > Á¤, deﬁned implicitly by
(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤¤) ¡ U] + ±EzV (Á¤¤) = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤¤) ¡ U] + ±EyV (Á¤¤) (3)
such that it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to hire the worker and assign him task z if Á 2 [Á¤;Á¤¤), but
to allocate him task y whenever Á 2 [Á¤¤;1]. If, instead, the worker’s assessed ability is less than
Á¤, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ by not employing him. Formally, let Áz;m be the value of the posterior
for which a myopic ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between employing the worker at task z and ﬁring him, i.e.,
z(Ám;z)¡U = Π or Ám;z = (Π+U ¡z(µ))=(z(µ)¡z(µ)). Recall that Ám;y has been similarly deﬁned
so as to satisfy y(Ám;y) ¡ U = Π, i.e., Ám;y = (Π + U ¡ y(µ))=(y(µ) ¡ y(µ)). It then follows:
Proposition 5. Let (A1)-(A2) hold. Suppose that ®2¯1 ¸ ®1¯2 and (®2 ¡ ¯2) ¡ (®1 ¡ ¯1) >
®2¯1 ¡ ®1¯2. Then, if z(µ) > Π (or, if Π > z(µ), there is ± 2 (0;1) such that for all ± > ±) there
exist Á¤ 2 (0;1) and Á¤¤ 2 (0;1), with Á¤¤ > Á¤, so that the ﬁrm’s optimal employment strategy in
any MPE consists in assigning the worker task y, if Á 2 [Á¤¤;1], task z, if Á 2 [Á¤;Á¤¤), and not
employing him if Á 2 [0;Á¤). Under this strategy, Á¤ < ˜ Áy < Á¤¤, i.e., the ﬁrm is more willing to
experiment on the worker’s ability than when only task y is available, and Á¤¤ > Á¤¤
m, i.e., the ﬁrm
experiments longer at z than in the static case.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The restrictions on the output distribution needed for the Proposition to hold have an imme-
diate interpretation in terms of increasing riskiness of the distribution of the updated posterior,
respectively '(Á j z) at task z and '(Á j y) task y. These conditions require that the distribu-
tion of the future values of the posterior under task z, conditional on its current period value, be
a mean-preserving spread of the corresponding distribution under y. Intuitively, since the ﬁrm’s
value function is convex in Á, a riskier distribution of the update of Á is always preferred by the
ﬁrm to a less risky one, given that it entails a faster speed of learning, if measured by the spread
in the distribution of the one-step ahead posterior. Notice that the restriction ®2¯1 ¸ ®1¯2 and




y, i.e., that the support of the
t+1-period values of Á is consistent with the desired second-order stochastic dominance result. In
the special case in which output signals are symmetrically distributed, i.e., ¯i = 1 ¡ ®i, i 2 f1;2g,
these conditions simplify to ®2 ¸ ®1. It is then suﬃcient that the distribution of output at task z
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the one at y.
13By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, it is possible to show that this value function is well-deﬁned
and continuous, increasing and convex in Á.
16On the other hand, the restriction Ám;z < Ám;y, or, equivalently, y(Ám;z) ¡ U < Π, ensures
that when task z starts being proﬁtable it strictly dominates task y (in static terms). Under this
condition there exists a range of values of Á for which the ﬁrm is strictly better oﬀ by assigning the
worker task z rather than task y both in the static and in the dynamic case. In particular, if the
signals were equally informative about ability, i.e., ® = ¹ and ¯ = º, the condition Ám;z < Ám;y
would be suﬃcient to guarantee that z is strictly preferred over y for intermediate values of Á.
Notice that Ám;z < Ám;y can also be rewritten as
[Π + U]fy(µ) ¡ y(µ) ¡ z(µ) + z(µ)g < y(µ)z(µ) ¡ y(µ)z(µ):
By assumptions (A1)-(A2), the left-hand side of the above is strictly positive. This implies that a
necessary condition for Ám;z < Ám;y to hold is






i.e., a worker of ability µ must have a comparative advantage at task y, while a worker of ability µ
at task z.
The greater accuracy of the inference process about ability at z than at y makes it proﬁtable
for the ﬁrm to assign the worker task z exactly when it is most uncertain about his ability, i.e., its
posterior belongs to the intermediate belief range [Á¤;Á¤¤). In these instances, the informational
gain from observing the worker’s performance at task z oﬀsets the proﬁt loss the ﬁrm incurs by
not allocating the worker task y, in case he is of high productivity, or not ﬁring him, in case he
is of low productivity. The value of learning at these intermediate states is also large enough to
overcome the eﬃciency loss the ﬁrm suﬀers by violating the pattern of comparative advantages.
Moreover, since Á¤ < ˜ Áy, employment is proﬁtable for values of Á for which the ﬁrm is better oﬀ
by not employing the worker if only task y is available. What lies at the heart of our result is the
trade-oﬀ the ﬁrm faces between maximizing the value of information, on one hand, and short-run
proﬁt, on the other, characteristic of incomplete information frameworks.
Along the lines of the argument used for the case in which only task y is available, it is also
possible to show that the equilibrium in which the ﬁrm employs the worker at wage U and assigns
him task z or y, respectively, if Á 2 [Á¤;Á¤¤) or Á 2 [Á¤¤;1], and does not employ him otherwise,
is constrained Pareto eﬃcient and it is essentially unique. Clearly, this equilibrium, entailing the
assignment of task z in some states, Pareto improves on the corresponding equilibrium achievable
when the ﬁrm can only assign the worker task y.
Proposition 6. Let (A1)-(A2) hold. Suppose also that ®2¯1 ¸ ®1¯2 and (®2 ¡ ¯2) ¡ (®1 ¡ ¯1) >
®2¯1 ¡ ®1¯2. Then:
17(i) Any strategy proﬁle (!¤;e¤;a¤) is an MPE if and only if
!¤(Á) =
(




y; if Á 2 [Á¤¤;1]




A; w ¸ U
R; otherwise
where w0 2 [0;U) and beliefs are determined according to Bayes’ rule. Any such equilibrium is
constrained Pareto eﬃcient and ex ante Pareto dominates the corresponding equilibrium of the
model in which the worker can only be assigned task y.
(ii) Every MPE is outcome equivalent to some sequential equilibrium.
Proof: By revealed preferences, the fact that any MPE of the model with two tasks dominate
ex ante the corresponding equilibrium (i.e., for given ﬁrm’s compensation strategy and worker’s
acceptance behavior) of the model with only task y is an immediate consequence of the fact that,
for task z to be assigned in equilibrium, it must be that it is more proﬁtable to the ﬁrm than y at
some value of Á. The rest of the proof follows the same argument as the one used in the proof of
Proposition 1.
2.2.1 Learning and Career Dynamics
To analyze the impact of learning on a worker’s career proﬁle, from now on we will assume
(A3’) : Á¤ < ¼ < Á¤¤
i.e., in the ﬁrst period a worker is employed by the ﬁrm and assigned task z. Let rz
t(µ) be the
probability that a worker of type µ is continuously employed by the ﬁrm at task z at least for the
ﬁrst t periods. By (A3’), rz
1(µ) = 1. The probability that a worker will be continuously employed
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t+1;t0(µ) to be the probability that a worker of type µ, who is assigned task y
at the beginning of period t + 1, when the ﬁrm’s posterior is Át+1, will be continuously allocated
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for Át+1 ¸ Á¤¤. In the deﬁnition of r
y
t+1;t0 dates have been relabelled so that 1 is the ﬁrst period the
worker is assigned task y. The following Proposition summarizes properties of the intertemporal
proﬁle of a worker’s tenure and task assignment.
Lemma 4. Under assumptions (A1)-(A3) the following results hold:













all °(Át+1) there exists a t such that, for all t > t, these inequalities are strict;
(ii) for all t, the probability of being assigned task y after task z is higher (strictly, for t suf-
ﬁciently large) for a type µ than for a type µ worker. Conditional on being assigned task z, the
probability of being ﬁred is higher (strictly, for t suﬃciently large) for a type µ than for a type µ
worker;
(iii) for all t0, the probability of being assigned task z after task y is higher (strictly, for t0
suﬃciently large) for a type µ than for a type µ worker.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Similarly to the case in which only task y is available, the probability of being continuously em-
ployed at task y is decreasing over time for each type of worker. But the decrease in the probability




t+1;t0+1(µ), is smaller when the worker is of high productivity
19than when he is of low productivity. As a result, the prospect of continuous employment at task y
is more favorable for a type µ than for a type µ worker (Lemma 4 (i)). While a high type worker has
a higher probability of being allocated task y after task z than a low type worker, the probability
of being ﬁred at task z is higher for a low than for a high ability worker (Proposition 4 (ii)). A
low ability worker is also more likely to be allocated task z, after having performed task y, than a
high ability worker (Lemma 4 (iii)).
The fact that a worker performing task z is assigned task y once Á ¸ Á¤¤, but is dismissed
altogether if Á < Á¤, corresponds to the use of task z as a sequential screening device, speciﬁcally
as a version of Wald’s sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). The SPRT is a sequential procedure
for testing a simple hypothesis H0 against a simple alternative H1. It prescribes sampling to
continue as long as an appropriate statistic of the observations falls in a predetermined interval and
to accept or reject H0 (i.e., µ = µ) depending on whether the test statistics falls in the pre-speciﬁed
acceptance or rejection (‘critical’) region. The SPRT satisﬁes a number of optimality properties:
it minimizes the expected sample size over all ﬁxed-sample-size tests having the same signiﬁcance
level (i.e., the probability of a type I error or, equivalently, the rejection of H0 when H0 is true)
and power (i.e., the probability of rejecting the hypothesis under consideration when µ = µ and
µ = µ). It is also a uniformly most-powerful test in the sense of Neyman-Pearson, i.e., the power
of the test associated with the chosen critical region is at least as large as the power of the test
associated with any other critical region of the same signiﬁcance level. In this sense, screening the
worker at z is information wise eﬃcient.
The trade-oﬀ between the type I error (i.e., assigning a low ability worker task y) and the type
II error (i.e., ﬁring a high ability worker) is apparent. The longer the period in which a worker is
continuously assigned task z, the more accurate the inference about the worker’s ability but the
larger the loss the ﬁrm incurs by employing a worker whose actual productivity might be low or
the larger proﬁt at y if µ = µ. On the other hand, the shorter the time a worker is allocated task z,
the higher the risk the ﬁrm faces of dismissing a high ability worker or assigning y to a low ability
worker, but the lower the loss in case of employment of a low productivity worker. Notice that
the indeterminacy in the choice of the size of the two errors, characteristic of the SPRT, is solved
under the ﬁrm’s optimal employment strategy. By construction, in fact, it balances eﬃciently the
need for maximization of the returns from the sampling process and the need to infer the value of
the unknown parameter of interest, µ. As we will show, though, even as the time horizon becomes
arbitrarily large the probability of a type II error is still strictly positive.
202.2.2 Limiting Retention and Task Assignment
Because of the trade-oﬀ between learning and short-run proﬁt maximization, the beneﬁt of assigning
a worker task z in our framework is only temporary, being related to the the greater informativeness
of task z with respect to task y in the inference process about ability. The intuition is as follows.
The proﬁtability to the ﬁrm of allocating a worker task z derives from the possibility of testing
whether the worker’s ability is indeed high at a lower cost, in terms of output destruction, than
by assigning him task y. By the Law of Large Numbers, though, the average number of successes
observed along a history in which a worker continuously performs task z will eventually converge
to the value of the worker’s actual ability. If the worker is revealed as being of high type, therefore,
the ﬁrm will assign him permanently task y, the most proﬁtable one if his productivity is µ, but, if
his performance at task z is unsatisfactory, the ﬁrm will ﬁre him.
As before, because of the opportunity cost incurred by the ﬁrm in experimenting, only with
strictly positive probability a worker will be retained forever at the ﬁrm. Still, the conditional
probability of retention of a high productivity worker converges to 1 as t grows arbitrarily large.
Formally, let p
y
t0+1;t0(µ) denote the conditional probability that a worker of type µ who has been
continuously employed for the ﬁrst t0 periods at task y will be employed at y in period t0 + 1 as
well. Then:
Proposition 7. Under assumptions (A1)-(A3) the following limiting results hold:
(i) limt!1 rz
t(µ) = limt!1 rz
t(µ) = 0.
(ii) 0 = limt0!1 r
y
t+1;t0(µ) < limt0!1 r
y




Proof: See the Appendix.
Notice that in the limit the risk of assigning a low ability worker task y is zero, i.e., the
probability of a type I error is zero. Since the purpose of having a worker perform task z is to
screen out low types, over time the ﬁrm always acquires enough information to convince it to either
assign the worker task y or dismiss him. As before, though, the ﬁrm’s learning is not complete:
even if a low ability worker will be ﬁred almost surely, the probability of retaining in the limit a
high ability worker is bounded away from one. In other words, even in the long run, then, the
type II error is strictly positive. Still, assigning task z improves (at least weakly) the prospect of
permanent retention of a high productivity worker, compared to the one-task case, because of the
ﬁrm’s increased willingness to experiment (continue).
212.3 Costly Switch of Tasks
Suppose now that the ﬁrm incurs the cost cz > 0 when assigning the worker task z if he was
allocated task y in the previous period and, symmetrically, the cost cy > 0 when assigning task y
if the worker has previously performed task z. In the presence of switching costs, the state of the
ﬁrm’s Bandit problem in a period cannot be adequately described by the updated posterior about
the worker’s ability, except at date 1. Rather, it also includes the arm (i.e., task) which was in
use in the period immediately preceding.14 Let x 2 fy;zg denote the incumbent arm. The ﬁrm’s
employment problem admits then a new value function, V : [0;1] £ fy;zg ! R, which satisﬁes the
following Bellman optimality equations at each (Á;x)
V (Á;z) = maxfΠ;Vz(Á;z);Vy(Á;z)g
= maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á) ¡ U] + ±EzV (Á;z);(1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U ¡ cy] + ±EyV (Á;y)g
V (Á;y) = maxfΠ;Vz(Á;y);Vy(Á;y)g
= maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á) ¡ U ¡ cz] + ±EzV (Á;z);(1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U] + ±EyV (Á;y)g
where EzV (Á;z) ´ E[V ('(Á j z);z) j Á] and EyV (Á;y) ´ E[V ('(Á j y);y) j Á]. Any measurable
selection from the correspondence of maximizers of the equations above constitutes a stationary
Markovian optimal strategy for the ﬁrm. Let
(A4) : y(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)cy > z(µ) > z(µ) > y(µ)
which ensures that, if the worker is of the highest ability and z was the arm in use in the previous
period, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ by assigning him task y rather then task z. Deﬁne Á¤(z) and Á¤¤(z)
to be, respectively, the cut-oﬀ belief values which make the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between employing
the worker at task z or not employing him and between assigning him task z or task y, when z
is the incumbent arm. Let, similarly, Á¤(y) and Á¤¤(y) be the cut-oﬀ belief values for which the
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent, respectively, between employing the worker at task z or not employing him and
between assigning him task z or task y, when y is the incumbent arm. Notice that the largest
value of cy for which task y is assigned in equilibrium is the one for which, when Á = 1, the two
tasks are equally proﬁtable, given our assumption that, when indiﬀerent, the ﬁrm allocates the
worker task y instead of task z. Solving for cy the equation Vz(1;z) = Vy(1;z), it is immediate that
this value is given by [y(µ) ¡ z(µ)]=[1 ¡ ±]. In fact, the ﬁrst inequality in assumption (A4) ensures
0 < cy < [y(µ) ¡ z(µ)]=(1 ¡ ±).
14See Banks and Sundaram [1994] for a detailed discussion.
22Proposition 8. Suppose (A4) holds, ®2¯1 ¸ ®1¯2 and (®2¡¯2)¡(®1¡¯1) > ®2¯1¡®1¯2. Then,
there exists ± 2 (0;1) such that, for all ± > ±, 0 < Á¤(z) < Á¤¤(z) < 1 and 0 < Á¤(y) < Á¤¤(y) < 1.
Moreover:
(i) for any ﬁxed cy > y(µ) ¡ z(µ), there exists a cz > 0 such that, for all 0 < cz < cz,
V (Á;y) > V (Á;z). Then, Á¤ · Á¤(z) < Á¤(y) < Á¤¤(y) < Á¤¤ < Á¤¤(z);
(ii) if cz ¸ Π + U ¡ y(µ), a worker assigned task y can be ﬁred but is never allocated task z.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Suppose that y is the incumbent arm. It is immediate that, with respect to the model without
switching costs, the threshold belief value Á¤(y) which makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between collecting
the outside option and employing the worker at y increases whenever cy > 0, i.e., Á¤ < Á¤(y). It is
also intuitive that, as the ﬁrm incurs a cost by changing the worker job assignment in a period, its
willingness to switch the worker across tasks decreases. In our framework this implies that, once
the worker is allocated z (respectively, y), the range of posteriors for which task y (respectively, z)
is proﬁtable is smaller with respect to the no-cost case, i.e., Á¤¤ < Á¤¤(z) (respectively, Á¤¤(y) <
Á¤¤). Once costs are present, these assignment frictions change the relative proﬁtability of the two
tasks, so that, when the worker performs task z, y is relatively less attractive to the ﬁrm and,
similarly, when the worker is assigned task y, z is proﬁtable for a smaller range of posteriors, i.e.,
Á¤(z) < Á¤(y) < Á¤¤(y) < Á¤¤(z).
By interpreting tasks as job positions, the claim under (ii) is an instance of the ‘no demotion’
result (see, for instance, Gibbons and Waldman [1999b]), according to which low performing work-
ers, once promoted, can be ﬁred but are almost never demoted back to the position from which
they have been promoted out. Notice that the result also proves a dynamic test of the learning
versus the human capital explanation of promotion dynamics: in the latter case, in fact, according
to the interpretation that promotion rewards the accumulation of nonveriﬁable ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital, demotions cannot occur in equilibrium, but ﬁrings do not take place either. In a number
of ﬁrm-level studies, instead, as documented for instance by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstr¨ om [1994a]
(henceforth, BGH), even if demotions are rare, exit is almost uniform across levels of a ﬁrm’s
hierarchy.
2.4 Learning on the Job
Suppose now that ability is still one-dimensional but imperfectly correlated across tasks (continue).
233 Two-Dimensional Ability
Suppose that the worker’s unknown productivity at the ﬁrm can now be described by the bundle
(µ1;µ2). As a diﬀerence with respect to the baseline case, the worker’s ability is not perfectly
correlated across tasks. Assume, in particular, that the worker can be one of three types, (µ;µ)
(type 1), (µ;µ) (type 2), and (µ;µ) (type 3). Let Á1 denote the ﬁrm and the worker’ posterior that
the worker is of type 1 and Á2 that he is of type 2. As before, the performance signal at each
task, where, as before, only high ir low output can realize, reveals information about the worker’s
underlying ability. Speciﬁcally, Pr(y j µ;µ) = ®1, Pr(y j µ;µ) = ®2 and Pr(y j µ;µ) = ®3, with
®1;®2;®3 2 (0;1) and ®1 > ®2 > ®3.15 At task z, similarly, Pr(z j µ;µ) = ¯1, Pr(z j µ;µ) = ¯2, and
Pr(z j µ;µ) = ¯3. Let the one-period expected proﬁt satisfy
(A5) : y(µ;µ) > Π + U > z(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ) > y(µ;µ)
(A6) : z(µ;µ) > y(µ;µ):
The ﬁrm’s value function for the new problem is given by
V (Á1;Á2) = maxfΠ;Vz(Á1;Á2);Vy(Á1;Á2)g (4)
where
Vz(Á1;Á2) = (1 ¡ ±)[Á1z(µ;µ) + Á2z(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)z(µ;µ) ¡ U] + ±EzV (Á1;Á2)
Vy(Á1;Á2) = (1 ¡ ±)[Á1y(µ;µ) + Á2y(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)y(µ;µ) ¡ U] + ±EyV (Á1;Á2):
Using standard arguments it is possible to show that the ﬁrm’s value function V is continuous,
increasing and convex in (Á1;Á2). Increasingness, in particular, is a direct consequence of the fact
that, at z, z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ) and z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ), while, at y, y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) and y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ).
Moreover, V (0;0) = V (0;1) = Π and V (1;0) = y(µ;µ)¡U. As in the baseline case, the relative size
of the probability of success at either task has implications for the informativeness of the output
signal at z and y. In particular:
Lemma 5. Let (A5) and (A6) hold. If ®2¯1 = ®1¯2 and (®3 ¡¯3)¡(®1 ¡¯1) > ®3¯2 ¡®1¯3 > 0,
then the conditional distribution of the updated posterior on Á1 and Á2 at task z is a mean-preserving
spread of the corresponding distributions at y.
Proof: Notice that '(Á1 j z) = ¯1Á1=[¯1Á1+¯2Á2+¯3(1¡Á1¡Á2)] and '(Á1 j y) = ®1Á1=[®1Á1+
®2Á2 + ®3(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)], while '(Á2 j z) = ¯2Á1=[¯1Á1 + ¯2Á2 + ¯3(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)] and '(Á2 j y) =
15Note that this implies that the output distribution of type 1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the output
distribution of type 2, which in turn ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the one of type 3.
24®2Á1=[®1Á1+®2Á2+®3(1¡Á1¡Á2)]. Then, ®2¯1 ¸ ®1¯2 and ®3¯1 > ®1¯3 imply '(Á1 j z) > '(Á1 j
y), while ®1¯2 ¸ ®2¯1 and ®3¯2 > ®2¯3 imply '(Á2 j z) > '(Á2 j y). Since ®3¯1 > ®3¯2, given
¯1 > ¯2, and ®1¯3 > ®2¯3, given ®1 > ®2, for both inequality to hold it is enough ®2¯1 = ®1¯2
and ®3¯2 > ®1¯3.
To guarantee that task z is therefore ‘more informative’ than task y, let then
(A7) : ®2¯1 = ®1¯2; ®3¯2 > ®1¯3:
Intuitively, when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently convinced that the worker is of type 3, the informational
gain from experimentation is too low to make employment proﬁtable. In this case, then, the outside
option is for the ﬁrm the dominant alternative. On the other hand, task z is as proﬁtable as the
outside option for the ﬁrm whenever Π = Vz(Á1;Á2) or, equivalently,
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[Á1z(µ;µ) + Á2z(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)z(µ;µ) ¡ U] + ±EzV (Á1;Á2): (5)
The conditions which guarantee that the equality is satisﬁed amount to requiring that the posterior
Á1 is high enough to oﬀset the (ﬂow) proﬁt loss the ﬁrm would incur by employing a type 2 or a
type 3 worker.
Lemma 6. Let (A5)-(A7) hold. Suppose ± ¸ ± = [Π ¡ z(µ;µ)]=[y(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ)]. Then, for
any Á2 2 [0;Á
2




z(0)], determined implicitly by (5), such that
Π = Vz(Á1;Á2). Equivalently, for any Á3 2 [0;Á
3





that Π = Vz(Á1;Á3).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Observe that the state of the game for both the ﬁrm and the worker can be described by their
common posterior about the worker’s ability, in this case the updated distribution on (µ1;µ2). Then,
the characterization of the locus of points where task z is as proﬁtable as the ﬁrm’s outside option
can be equivalently stated in terms of Á1 and Á2 or in terms of Á1 and Á3. Still, to verify that,
in the three type case as well, task z is valuable only for intermediate belief values, i.e., once y is
allocated to the worker, it continues to be optimal for any higher values of Á1, it is necessary to
show that a single crossing property holds for both the diﬀerence Vy(Á1;Á2) ¡ Vz(Á1;Á2) and the
diﬀerence Vy(Á1;Á3) ¡ Vz(Á1;Á3).
Lemma 7. Under (A5)-(A7), the following holds:
(i) there exists ± 2 (0;1) such that, for all ± > ±, at any (Á1;Á2) for which Π = Vz(Á1;Á2), the
ﬁrm strictly prefers task z to task y;
25(ii) if y(µ;µ)¡y(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ)¡z(µ;µ), the diﬀerences Vy(Á1;Á2)¡Vz(Á1;Á2) and Vy(Á1;Á3)¡
Vz(Á1;Á3) are increasing in Á1. This implies that, for given Á2 or Á3, there exists a unique value
of Á1, respectively Á¤
zy(Á2) or Á¤






Proof: See the Appendix.
The above Lemma implies that there exists a set of prior distributions for which the worker is
assigned task z when ﬁrst employed. Task z acts as a training ground: once the worker has proved
successful at it, i.e., once a suﬃciently long sequence of high output, he is allocated task y, where
he is retained as long as his performance is satisfactory. These features of the optimal policy are
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose (A5)-(A7) hold. Under the optimal employment policy, solution to the
problem described in (4), a worker assigned task z is assigned task y after a suﬃcient number
of high output signals realize and ﬁred after a suﬃcient number of low output signals. A worker
assigned task y is retained at it as long as high output occurs. After a long enough sequence of low
output realizations, he can either be assigned task z or ﬁred.
Proof: A consequence of Lemma 6 and 7.
Intuitively, the extent to which a worker assigned task y, who has previously performed task z,
is allocated z again depends on the set of posterior beliefs for which z is more proﬁtable than y (and
of the ﬁrm’s outside option) and on the informativeness of the output signal at y. Interpreting the
assignment of task y, after task z, as a ‘promotion’, from the above Proposition ‘demotions’ back
to z have positive frequency in equilibrium. However, if the performance signal at y was relatively
uninformative, even after poor performance at y a worker would not be assigned z, but he would
not be ﬁred either, while a robust ﬁnding in the data is that ﬁrm-level exit rates are signiﬁcant at
high levels of a hierarchy as well.
As the analysis to follow suggests, one way to reconcile the fact that low performing promoted
workers can be ﬁred but are almost never demoted is to think at low level tasks as providing
accurate information along some dimensions of interest. Once the informational rationale from
assigning them disappears, it is no longer proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to allocate them. Still, if there
exists residual uncertainty about the worker overall skill, once assigned a higher level task a worker
might be ﬁred, if he produces a long enough record of bad output realizations.
263.1 The No-Demotion Case
Suppose that task z perfectly reveals whether the worker is of type 3. Namely, Pr(z j µ;µ) = Pr(z j
µ;µ) = 1, while Pr(z j µ;µ) = 0. Let '(Á1 j z) denote the updated posterior, under Bayes’ rule, that
the worker is of type 1 after a high output realization at z. Then, '(Á1 j z) = Á1=(Á1 + Á2) ´ ˜ Á1.
Similarly, '(Á2 j z) = Á2=(Á1 + Á2) ´ 1 ¡ ˜ Á1, while '(Á3 j z) = 0. Then, z(µ;µ) = z(µ;µ). The
value to the ﬁrm of using task z can now be expressed as
Vz(Á1;Á2) = (1 ¡ ±)[(Á1 + Á2)z(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)z(µ;µ) ¡ U]
+ ±(Á1 + Á2)˜ V (˜ Á1) + ±(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)Π
where ˜ V (˜ Á1) = maxfΠ; ˜ Vy(˜ Á1)g and
˜ Vy(˜ Á1) = (1 ¡ ±)[˜ Á1y(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ ˜ Á1)y(µ;µ) ¡ U] + ±Ey ˜ V (˜ Á1)g:
The informativeness of the output signal at task z has natural implications for the equilibrium
assignment decision. Once a worker is assigned task z in a period, the ﬁrm’s remaining uncertainty
is only as to whether he is actually ﬁt for y. Should the worker not perform satisfactorily at it, the
ﬁrm is then better oﬀ by ﬁring him. Formally:
Lemma 8. Suppose (A5) and (A6) hold. If the worker is assigned task z and a low output signal
realizes, the worker is permanently ﬁred. If the worker is assigned task z and a high output signal
occurs, he is allocated task y. The retention rule at y is a reservation-belief strategy, i.e., the worker
is employed at task y if and only if Á1=(Á1 + Á2) ¸ Á¤
y and dismissed (forever) otherwise.
Proof: The ﬁrst part is due to the fact that '(Á1 j z) = '(Á2 j z) = 0, while '(Á3 j z) = 1, and
Π > y(µ;µ). The second part is an immediate consequence of the fact that the ﬁrm’s employment
problem at task y, if the worker has performed task z in the previous period, can be described by
the value function V ('(Á1 j z);'(Á2 j z)) ´ V (˜ Á1) (since '(Á2 j z) = '(Á1 j z)), given by
˜ V (˜ Á1) = maxfΠ; ˜ Vy(˜ Á1)g
= maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[˜ Á1y(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ ˜ Á1)y(µ;µ) ¡ U] + ±Ey ˜ V (˜ Á1)g (6)
as in the standard one-armed bandit. As shown in the baseline model for the one-task case, the
cut-oﬀ belief strategy under which the worker is employed at y if and only if ˜ Á1 ¸ Á¤
y, where Á¤
y
is determined so as to equate the reservation value Π to ˜ Vy(˜ Á1), and terminated otherwise is the
unique optimal solution. The necessity part of the statement derives from the fact that in this
framework a sequential equilibrium is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
27As before, the conditions under which task z is as proﬁtable for the ﬁrm as the outside option
amount to requiring that the informational gain from trying the worker’s ability at z is suﬃcient
to compensate the ﬁrm for employing possibly a low skill worker. As a diﬀerence from the previ-
ous three type case, though, the trade-oﬀ at task z is such that, provided the discount factor is
suﬃciently high, an increase in Á2 decreases its proﬁtability, since it makes experimentation at y
riskier, i.e., it decreases ˜ V (˜ Á1). The appropriate version of Lemma 6 is then:
Lemma 9. Suppose (A5) and (A6) hold. Then, there exists ± 2 (0;1) such that, for all ± > ±,
the following holds: for any Á2 2 [0;Á
2




)] such that Π =
Vz(Á1;Á2). Equivalently, for any Á3 2 [0;Á
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Proof: See the Appendix.
Notice that Lemma 7 applies to the present case as well. Then, the optimal policy can be
characterized as follows:
Proposition 10. Suppose (A5) and (A6) hold. Under the optimal employment policy, solution
to the problem described in (4), a worker assigned task z is assigned task y after a high output
realization and ﬁred after a low one. A worker assigned task y, after having performed task z in the
period immediately preceding, can be ﬁred after a suﬃciently long sequence of low output realizations
but he is never assigned task z again.
Proof: A consequence of Lemma 9 and 7.
This characterization result implies a ‘no-demotion’ feature of the optimal policy. Once the
worker is assigned task y he can only be continually allocated task y or ﬁred, consistently with the
observation that workers promoted out of a given job level are almost never re-assigned to it, even
if, in case their performance becomes unsatisfactory at the new level, they can still be terminated.16
4 Labor Market Competition
Suppose now that there exists a market in which 2 ﬁrms compete for the labor services of the worker
by announcing simultaneously a wage and a task assignment at the beginning of each period t. Both
ﬁrms have the same unit costs normalized to zero. Upon entering the labor market, the worker is
randomly matched with one of the two ﬁrms. Assume also that the worker’s performance is publicly
16Notice that here a promotion does not bring a wage increase to the worker, but it entails a change in task, under
the interpretation that diﬀerent tasks reﬂect diﬀerent job contents.
28observable to all market participants. For simplicity, let both the ﬁrms and the worker’s outside
option be equal to zero. We will show in the following that the interaction of the strategic aspects
of outside labor market competition with ﬁrm-level experimentation does alter the eﬃciency of
each ﬁrm’s assignment strategies and, as a consequence, of turnover.
Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki [1996] (henceforth BV) analyze a very similar set up in which two
sellers price compete to provide a good of uncertain quality to a single buyer and they proved that
all MPE of this game are eﬃcient. In our framework, their result would imply eﬃciency of turnover
in case each ﬁrm’s decision consisted only in whether or not to hire the worker. Their intuition is
that strategic competition can sustain eﬃcient learning (and, therefore, dynamically eﬃcient trade)
if the exchange of the costs and beneﬁts of experimentation is frictionless both intertemporally and
interpersonally. Eﬃciency, and multiplicity of equilibria, derives from the fact that equilibrium
prices only determine diﬀerent allocations of the surplus among the parties.
Similarly, in our case as well the ﬁrm employing the worker is selected eﬃciently in equilibrium.
But, as a diﬀerence with respect to BV, competition renders the assignment decision ineﬃcient,
since the two ﬁrms might not agree on the relative proﬁtability of the two tasks, while the equilib-
rium assignment only internalizes the preference over the two tasks of the ﬁrm currently employing
the worker. This in turn implies that MPE are typically ineﬃcient. Equilibria are eﬃcient only
under the restriction that technologies are suﬃciently similar, i.e., if the probability of a high out-
put signal is the same across ﬁrms, or, equivalently, if ﬁrms’ marginal valuations of ability are
suﬃciently congruent. Deﬁne, analogously to BV, an MPE (in stationary strategies) to be cautious
if the ﬁrm not employing the worker is indiﬀerent between hiring and not hiring the worker. Notice
that now assumptions (A1)-(A2) are required to hold at each ﬁrm, with probability of success at
either task given, respectively, by ®k
x, for type µ and ¯k
x, for type µ, with k 2 f1;2g and x 2 fz;yg.
Correspondingly, zk(µ) and yk(µ) are, respectively, the expected product of a worker of type µ at
task z or y in ﬁrm k. Denote by i the ﬁrm employing the worker and by j the ﬁrm not employing
the worker. Then:
Proposition 11. If assumptions (A1)-(A2) are satisﬁed at each ﬁrm, then:







x 2 fz;yg, and zj = azi + b, yj = ayi + b, with a > 0 and for each zi 2 fz;zg, yi 2 fy;yg;
(ii) in the cautious equilibrium wi(Á) = xj(Á), where xj 2 fzj;yjg, i;j 2 f1;2g, and the wage
policy of the non-employing ﬁrm is a supermartingale, i.e., wj(Á) ¸ ±Ewj('(Á j xi)).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Notice that the ineﬃciency of turnover, as stated in (i), does not depend on the worker’s human
capital being general or ﬁrm-speciﬁc, given the assumption of public observability of job assignment
29and performance outcomes. On the other hand, eﬃciency holds only in case technologies merely
diﬀer in the size of the realized output at either task. In this case, provided the ﬁrm are not
symmetric, it also follows that the ﬁrm employing the ﬁrm obtain a non-zero ﬂow proﬁt, as long as
xi(Ái) 6= xj(Áj).17
The characteristics of the wage dynamics generated under the cautious equilibrium closely re-
semble dynamic patterns widely documented in the data (see, for instance, Gibbons and Waldman
[1999a, 1999b]). The four facts which seem to be most supported by the data on wage and pro-
motion dynamics inside ﬁrms are: (i) real wage decreases are frequent but demotions are rare, (ii)
promotion rates are serially correlated, (iii) wage increases at promotions are signiﬁcant but small
compared to the diﬀerences between average wages across levels of a job ladder, and (iv) workers
who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted more
quickly to the next, i.e., wage increases ‘predict’ promotions. While the ﬁrst cannot be properly
addressed in the present context of a one-good economy, serial correlation in promotion rates, i.e.,
the fact that promotion rates decrease with tenure in the current job, depends in our model on how
far apart the prior ¼ is from the cut-ﬀ belief value for which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between task z and
y. For low levels of ¼, it can be typically increasing in tenure on z, given that a suﬃcient number
of high output realizations must realize for the worker to be assigned y. In other words, only for
the most able at z, i.e., the workers on z with the highest posteriors, serial correlation holds.18
The fact that promotions are associated with wage increases, but that wage increases are small
relative to the diﬀerence between average wages across levels of the job ladder, is an immediate
consequence of the output signal at each task being discrete and of the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s
assignment policy. For a worker to be assigned y, in fact, the last output realized at z must have
been a high one, which implies an increase in paid wage between the last period in z and the ﬁrst
period in y (even if, as shown in Proposition 11, being the belief process a martingale, the expected
wage is always equal to the current wage). On the other hand, the fact that the assignment of
either task occurs for an interval of posterior values, whose lengths depend on how farther apart, Á¤
is from 0 and Á¤¤ is from 1, the size of this wage increase can be small compared to the diﬀerence
between average wages at z and at y (and the dispersion of wages at either task/job
depends on the frequency of a switch of firm). The fact that workers who receive large
wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next,
i.e., the probability of promotion in t+1 is an increasing function of the wage received in t, in our
framework derives from the fact that the paid wage is linear in Á and that the probability of being
17Observe that the result only depends on expected output being linear in the common posterior. It then carries
over to more general speciﬁcations of technology.
18Notice that, on the contrary, in BGH this serial correlation is especially pronounced at low levels of prior tenure.
30assigned task y, for a worker currently on z, increases in Á.19
5 Related Literature
There are several related strands of literature. Closest in spirit to ours are learning and human-
capital acquisition models which analyze job assignment and career choices. Harris and Weiss [1984]
study a two-job matching model of occupational choice in which workers are ﬁnitely lived. While
in ‘primary’ jobs a worker’s productivity is unknown, so that learning about ability takes place
through the observation of output over time, in ‘secondary’ jobs a worker’s ability is known with
certainty. As a result of this assumed independence in the structure of uncertainty, when workers
are risk neutral they all begin their careers in primary jobs and switch to secondary jobs only after
a suﬃciently long history of low performances in the primary job. Given the ﬁnite retirement age,
all workers who achieve at least a certain cumulative output record by a certain age will remain in
the primary job until retirement.
Waldman [1984b] analyzes a two-period two-job assignment problem in presence of learning and
human capital accumulation. He examines an environment in which a worker’s ability is perfectly
observable only by a worker’s current employer after the ﬁrst period of employment, but that a
worker’s job assignment is publicly observable. Both under spot and long-term contracting (a
contract consisting in a wage-job assignment pair), and in the latter case when the ﬁrm’s contract
oﬀer is constrained by what other ﬁrms would oﬀer old workers in the second period, equilibrium
wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs rather than ability levels. Under spot
contracting a worker not promoted in the second period of employment experiences a downward
sloping age-earnings proﬁle. Moreover, under these assumptions there exists ineﬃcient allocation of
workers to jobs, whose severity is negatively correlated with the level of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
in the economy. The presence of human capital acquisition in his model rules out the degenerate
equilibrium outcome in which only workers of the highest ability are assigned the highest job in the
second period. The optimal employment policy in his model is similar to ours, in the sense that job
assignment is determined by threshold ability levels. Since ability is perfectly revealed to the ﬁrst-
period employer after one period of production, the dynamics of learning is ignored. Moreover, in
our dynamic bandit setting if output is non-contractible there is no beneﬁt to long-term contracting.
19Another fact frequently cited is the existence of correlation in wage increases, i.e., the fact that the expected
wage increase, conditional on the current wage increase and the last period wage, is an increasing function of the
current wage increase: Efwt+1 ¡ wt j wt ¡ wt¡1;wt¡1g. In our model, given that wage is linear in Á and the belief
process is a martingale, the expected wage increase is always zero, both conditionally and unconditionally. Still in
BGH, as an example, this feature of wage dynamics does not seem robust.
31Gibbons and Waldman [1999b] analyze a model on job assignment, learning and human capital
acquisition which accounts for a broad pattern of evidence on wage and career dynamics inside
ﬁrms. They assume that there exist an output interaction between learning and human capital
acquisition which determines the worker’s expected product in a period. Since human capital is
accumulated by experience, all workers eventually reach the highest job position in the hierarchy.20
Because of learning on the part of the ﬁrm and the accumulation of skills on the part of the worker,
demotions are rare. In their model as well the hierarchy is inferred from the pattern of job-to-job
transitions and results from the assumption that higher ability is more valuable in higher level
jobs. As a diﬀerence from theirs, though, in our framework workers move up the job ladder over
time purely as a consequence of the ﬁrm’s improved estimate of their ability, not because human
capital acquisition causes eﬀective ability to increase. In addition mobility to higher-level jobs is
speciﬁcally identiﬁed in our model by the transition from job positions characterized by low output
risk to job position associated with greater output risk.
A similar characterization of job transitions is obtained by Jovanovic and Nyarko [1997]’s
‘stepping-stone’ model of occupational mobility, which combines as well learning and human-capital
acquisition. The accumulation of skills in their model occurs in the form of acquisition of informa-
tion on how to perform a given task. Speciﬁcally, one period of production resolves the uncertainty
about a worker’s production function in a certain occupation and reduces the uncertainty about
the proﬁtability of the alternative occupation. As a result, since experimentation is costly in an
opportunity cost sense, workers in equilibrium always move from lower to higher paying occupa-
tions, i.e., from low to high variance jobs. The model bears a number of similarities with ours.
For instance, they predict that the complexity of a job, measured in terms of the size of output
destruction in case of a mistake, should increase over a worker’s lifetime. Therefore, activities
which are informationally close, in the sense that part of the skills acquired on a given task can be
transferred to another occupation, will be part of an occupational ladder in which safer jobs are
tried ﬁrst. The bandit version of their model, unlike ours, displays though the opposite feature.
6 Conclusion
The paper has investigated the impact of ﬁrm’s learning about workers’ unknown characteristics on
the intertemporal proﬁle of a worker’s tenure and job assignment. Properties of a worker’s career
prospect and of the dynamics of job transitions have been derived under alternative assumptions
about a ﬁrm’s monitoring and production technology and (price) competition in the outside labor
20This occurs even if workers are ﬁnitely lived because of their restriction on the length of the time horizon, i.e.,
T ¸ 5.
32market. In particular, under the hypothesis that the ﬁrm can generate diﬀerent performance signals,
depending on the worker’s task or job position, and that ﬁrms compete for the labor services of
the worker, the characterization of a ﬁrm’s optimal employment policy has been shown to generate
predictions which are consistent with certain empirical ﬁndings concerning wage, promotion and
career systems inside ﬁrms.
Aspects of the analysis which deserve further investigation relate, for instance, to the trade-oﬀ
between short-run proﬁt-maximization and learning when workers accumulate human capital on
the job (for instance, through an unobservable learning-by-doing component of eﬀort) or to the
case in which there is competition for workers in the outside labor market, but ﬁrms other than
the worker’s current employer can only observe the worker’s assignment. These extensions would
reinforce our account for the empirically strong link between wage and promotion dynamics (see,
for a reference, Baker, Gibbs and Holmstr¨ om [1994a]), and for the eﬀect of a worker’s job level
on the timing (and correlation in the rate) of promotions and on the size of the associated wage
increase. They would also enable us to assess the relative predictive power of human capital versus
learning models, in presence of a non trivial task assignment problem.
The model also abstracts from the consideration that jobs have scarcity value, arising from
output complementarity and capacity constraints (as in athletic teams) or from heterogeneity among
cooperating inputs in the production process (as in the assignment of workers of diﬀerent unknown
productivity to pieces of equipment which require at most one operator). These features have a
clear impact on sorting and mobility - within and among organizations - and on their eﬀect on
wages and occupational mobility.21 The investigation of these issues will constitute the object of
future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: (i) The equivalence between the ﬁrm’s optimal stopping problem and the
dynamic programming problem deﬁning V f is established in Hinderer [1970]. The properties of V f
follow from a straightforward application of the Contraction Mapping Theorem. In particular, the
increasingness of E[V f('(Á j y)) j Á] in Á derives from the fact that Á0 < Á00 implies that '(Á00 j y)
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates '(Á0 j y). From this, in fact, it is possible to conclude that for
f increasing in Á, E[f('(Á j y)) j Á] is also increasing in Á. The convexity of V f in Á can be proved
by the same argument used by Banks and Sundaram [1992a] in the proof of Lemma 3.1 part (i).
(ii) An immediate consequence of (A1’) and (A2’).
21See Davis [1997] for a discussion.
33Proof of Proposition 2: The proof builds on the same argument used in the proof of Proposition
2 in Araujo and Camargo [2002]. Let f(Á) ´ ˜ V f(Á) = y(Á) ¡ U. By the Bayes’ updating rule and
the linearity of ˜ V f(Á) in Á, it follows E[f('(Á j y)) j Á] = y(Á) ¡ U, so that
Tf(Á) = maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)˜ V f(Á) + ±E[f('(Á j y)) j Á]g = maxfΠ; ˜ V f(Á)g ¸ f(Á):
By standard arguments it is possible to show that T is a monotone contraction mapping. Since T
is monotone, Tn¡1f(Á) · Tnf(Á) for all n 2 N and Á 2 [0;1], which yields f(Á) · limn!1 Tnf(Á).
Since T is a contraction, Tnf converges uniformly to its unique ﬁxed point V f. Then, since uniform
convergence implies pointwise convergence, f(Á) · V f(Á) for all Á 2 [0;1]. From the deﬁnition of
˜ Áy and the fact that f(Á) · V f(Á), it follows
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[y(˜ Áy) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(˜ Áy j y)) j ˜ Áy]
¸ (1 ¡ ±)[y(˜ Áy) ¡ U] + ±E[f('(˜ Áy j y)) j ˜ Áy] = ˜ V f(˜ Áy)
Since ˜ V f(Ám;y) = Π, the above implies ˜ V f(Ám;y) ¸ ˜ V f(˜ Áy). With ˜ V f(Á) increasing in Á, it must
be Ám;y ¸ ˜ Áy. Observe that
Tf(Á) = maxfΠ;f(Á)g > f(Á)
for all Á 2 [0;Ám;y), by deﬁnition of Ám;y. Since there exists a Á 2 supp('(Ám;y j y)) such that
Á < Ám;y, it follows
E[Tf('(Ám;y j y)) j Ám;y] > E[f('(Ám;y j y)) j Ám;y] = f(Ám;y)
which implies
(1 ¡ ±)[y(Ám;y) ¡ U] + ±E[Tf('(Ám;y j y)) j Ám;y] > (1 ¡ ±)[y(Ám;y) ¡ U] + ±f(Ám;y)
= y(Ám;y) ¡ U = f(Ám;y)
and, therefore,
T2f(Ám;y) = maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[y(Ám;y) ¡ U] + ±E[Tf('(Ám;y j y)) j Ám;y]g
> y(Ám;y) ¡ U = f(Ám;y)
from which it is possible to conclude V f(Ám;y) = limn!1 Tnf(Ám;y) > f(Ám;y). Thus,
V f(Ám;y) > f(Ám;y) = Π = V f(˜ Áy)
which yields Ám;y > ˜ Áy.
34Proof of Proposition 3: Notice ﬁrst that ½t(µ) · ½t+1(µ) for all t ¸ 1 and µ 2 fµ;µg. The
decrease in the probability of retention of a type-µ worker from date t to date t + 1 is given by
Ãt(µ) = ½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ), which is equal to the probability that a worker of type µ will be employed
for exactly t periods (i.e., he will be ﬁred at the beginning of period t + 1). Since ½1(µ) = 1, it is
possible to show that, for all t ¸ 2,




where C1 = fc1 : c1 · b¸¡°c¡1g and Ct = f(c1;:::;ct) : (c1;:::;ct¡1) 2 Ct¡1;ct · b¸t ¡ °c¡c1 ¡
::: ¡ ct¡1 ¡ 1g for t ¸ 2. Therefore,






































´ () c1 + ::: + ct < ¸t
but (c1;:::;ct) 2 Ct implies that c1 + ::: + ct · b¸t ¡ °c ¡ 1 · ¸t, so that the above holds for all
(c1;:::;ct) 2 Ct. Since Ct might be empty (for ° high, for example), it follows Ãt(µ) ¡ Ãt(µ) · 0.
Also, from
Ãt(µ) ¡ Ãt(µ) = ½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ) ¡ ½t(µ) + ½t+1(µ) · 0
it is possible to conclude that, for all t ¸ 1, ½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ) · ½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ). Observe that
½1(µ) = ½1(µ) = 1, together with ½1(µ) ¡ ½2(µ) · ½1(µ) ¡ ½2(µ), implies that ½2(µ) · ½2(µ). Given
½2(µ) ¡ ½3(µ) · ½2(µ) ¡ ½3(µ) · ½2(µ) ¡ ½3(µ)
it also follows ½3(µ) · ½3(µ). Proceeding similarly, we obtain ½t(µ) · ½t(µ) for all t ¸ 1. Now, to
show that these inequalities hold strictly, it is just suﬃcient to show that Ct is non-empty for t
suﬃciently large. Let t be the ﬁrst t such that c1 + ::: + ct < b¸t ¡ °c, i.e., b¸t ¡ °c > 0. Notice
that, since ° is ﬁnite for any possible choice of ¼, such t always exists. But this implies that, for
t < t, c1 + ::: + ct ¸ b¸t ¡ °c, so that Ct¡1 is non-empty, and, for t = t, c1 + ::: + ct < b¸t ¡ °c,
from which it follows that Ct is non-empty either. Therefore, Ct0 is non-empty for all t0 > t.






2 (1 ¡ ®2)t¡1¡c1¡:::¡ct¡1 · PrfXt¡1(µ) ¸ b¸(t ¡ 1) ¡ °cg
35since Ct¡1 ½ f(c1;:::;ct¡1) : c1 + ::: + ct¡1 ¸ b¸(t ¡ 1) ¡ °cg, where Xt¡1(µ) denotes the number
of successes in t ¡ 1 Bernoulli trials when the probability of success is ®2. By the Law of Large
Numbers for the Bernoulli distribution (see Feller [1965], Ch. 6), we know that, for all " > 0,






















where the latter inequality always holds by strict concavity of the logarithm. Since ¸ > ®2, we
know that there exists a t such that, if t ¸ t, then b¸(t¡1)¡°c > ®2(t¡1). Let " =
b¸(t¡1)¡°c
t¡1 ¡®2.
Then, for any t ¸ t,
PrfXt¡1(µ) ¸ b¸(t ¡ 1) ¡ °cg · PrfXt¡1(µ) ¸ (t ¡ 1)(®2 + ")g
since
b¸(t ¡ 1) ¡ °c ¸ (t ¡ 1)(®2 + ") =
(t ¡ 1)b¸(t ¡ 1) ¡ °c
t ¡ 1
if t ¸ t. It is then possible to conclude that ½t(µ) ! 0 as t ! 1. As for the asymptotic behavior
of ½t(µ), observe that the sequence f½t(µ)g is bounded and decreasing, so it has a limit. The above
result, together with ½t(µ) < ½t(µ) for t suﬃciently large (Proposition 3), implies that this limit
must be strictly positive. In addition, the fact that ½t(µ) ¸ ½t+1(µ) for all t and, with Ct non-empty
for t large enough (see Proposition 3), ½t0(µ) > ½t0+1(µ) for some t0 ¸ 2, this limiting probability is
bounded away from one.
(ii) Since pt+1;t(µ) ´
½t+1(µ)











as claimed. Notice that this convergence could be highly non-monotone even if the distributions of
reward satisfy MLRP. See Banks and Sundaram [1991] for details.







[½t(µ) ¡ ½t+1(µ)]t = ½1(µ) ¡ ½2(µ) + 2½2(µ) ¡ 2½3(µ) + :::




By (i) and Bernstein inequality (see Shiryaev [1995], Ch. 1, Section 6, page 55), which characterizes
how the empirical mean
Xt¡1(µ)
t¡1 converges to the expected value ¯, it follows
PrfXt¡1(µ) ¸ (t ¡ 1)(®2 + ")g · 2e¡2"2(t¡1)











By the integral test for convergence of a series, the series
P1
t=1 2e¡2"2t converges if and only if
R 1



















2e¡2"2t + 2 =
e¡2"2
"2 + 2 < 1
for ﬁxed " > 0. Let now Et[T(µ)] denote the expected number of periods of employment of a worker
of type µ at the beginning of period t ¸ 1. Since limt!1 pt+1;t(µ) = 1, it follows limt!1 Et[T(µ)] =
1. From E1[T(µ)] ¸ Et[T(µ)], we obtain E1[T(µ)] = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3: (i) The fact that V f is well-deﬁned, continuous and increasing in Á can be
showed by a Contraction Mapping argument analogous to the one used in Lemma 2. As for the
convexity of V f, the argument is again an immediate application of the proof of Lemma 3.1 part
(i) in Banks and Sundaram [1992a]. (ii) An immediate consequence of (A1) and (A2).
Proof of Proposition 5: Recall that, by deﬁnition of Á¤
z,
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤
z) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤




z) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
z j z)) j Á¤
z] > (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤
z) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
z j y)) j Á¤
z] (7)
together with
y(1) ¡ U > (1 ¡ ±)[z(1) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(1 j z)) j 1] > Π (8)
yields (
Π > (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤
z) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
z j y)) j Á¤
z];





z) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
z j z)) j Á¤
z]
> (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤
z) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
z j y)) j Á¤
z];
y(1) ¡ U > (1 ¡ ±)[z(1) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(1 j z)) j 1]:
From this, it is possible to conclude, respectively, that there exists a unique value Á¤




Π = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤
y) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
y j y)) j Á¤
y]
and a unique value Á¤¤ 2 (0;1), with Á¤¤ > Á¤
z, satisfying22
(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤¤) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤¤ j z)) j Á¤¤]
= (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤¤) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤¤ j y)) j Á¤¤]:
Since Á¤¤ > Á¤
z, by deﬁnition of Á¤




if (7) is satisﬁed. We will now prove that, under the conditions stated in the Proposition, (7) holds
true. Note ﬁrst that y(Á¤
z) ¡ z(Á¤
z) < 0 is equivalent to Á¤
z < Á¤
zy, where Á¤zy is the belief value
for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent, in static terms, between task z and y. Recall that Ám;z is the
value of the posterior belief satisfying z(Ám;z) ¡ U = Π. It is immediate that Á¤
z · Ám;z. Since
Ám;z < Á¤
zy is equivalent to y(Ám;z) ¡ U < Π or Ám;z < Ám;y, this latter restriction, combined with
Á¤




z) < 0. Notice that, if ®2¯1 > ®1¯2, Áh
z > Áh
y for Á




z, if Á is interior.
Moreover, if (®2 ¡ ¯2) ¡ (®1 ¡ ¯1) > ®2¯1 ¡ ®1¯2, it follows to Ál
y > Ál





z, for Á 2 (0;1), if ®2¯1 > ®1¯2 and (®2 ¡ ¯2) ¡ (®1 ¡ ¯1) > ®2¯1 ¡ ®1¯2.
Consider now the distributions of the next period value of Á, Á0, conditional on the worker being
assigned task z or y. Denote these two distributions, respectively, by F(Á0;z) and G(Á0;y). The
mean of the two distributions is Á. Now, the fact that Áhz > Áhy > Ály > Álz and F(Á0;z) and
G(Á0;y) are two-outcome distributions imply that F(Á0;z) constitutes a mean-preserving spread of
G(Á0;y). Therefore, G(Á0;y) second-order stochastically dominates F(Á0;z). By deﬁnition, for any





Ã(x)dG(x) for every non-decreasing convex function Ã : R+ ! R.23 It then
follows E[V f('(Á¤
z j z)) j Á¤
z] ¸ E[V f('(Á¤
z j y)) j Á¤
z], where Ã = V f, by convexity of V f. For
± 2 (0;1), this condition, together with y(Á¤
z)¡z(Á¤
z), implies that the inequality in (7) holds true.
22Uniqueness of Á
¤¤ derives from the monotonicity (in Á) of the diﬀerence in the dynamic values to the ﬁrm of
using task z and y (include the argument adapted from Kakigi [1983]).
23See Deﬁnition 6.D.2 in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [1995].
38We now verify that Á¤
z = ˜ Áz, i.e., Á¤
z equals the threshold belief value ˜ Áz for which the ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent between employing and not employing the worker if only task z is available. Denote by
V f
z (Á) = maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á) ¡ U] + ±E[V f
z ('(Á j z)) j Á]g
the ﬁrm’s value function for the problem in which an employed worker can only be assigned task
z. Then, ˜ Áz can be deﬁned implicitly as the value of the ﬁrm’s posterior satisfying
V f
z (˜ Áz) = Π = (1 ¡ ±)[z(˜ Áz) ¡ U] + ±E[V f
z ('(˜ Áz j z)) j ˜ Áz]: (9)
Analogously, Á¤
z 2 (0;1) has been deﬁned to satisfy
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤
z) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
z j z)) j Á¤
z] (10)
where V f indicates the ﬁrm’s value function for the problem in which tasks y and z are available.
Observe also that, under (7), V f(Á¤
z) = Π. By inspection of (9) and (10), it thus follows Á¤
z = ˜ Áz.
For the last part of the claim, observe ﬁrst that V f(Á) ¸ V
f
y (Á) for all Á, where V
f
y indicates now
the ﬁrm’s value function for the problem in which only task y is available. Recall that ˜ Áy is the
corresponding threshold belief value for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between employing and not
employing the worker, deﬁned implicitly by
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[y(˜ Áy) ¡ U] + ±E[V f
y ('(˜ Áy j y)) j ˜ Áy]:
Recall from above that Á¤ ´ Á¤
z < Á¤
y < Á¤¤, where Á¤
y is deﬁned implicitly by
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤
y) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤
y j y)) j Á¤
y]:
Since V f(Á) ¸ V
f
y (Á) for all Á and both V f and V
f
y are monotonic in Á, it follows Á¤
y · ˜ Áy, which
yields Á¤ < ˜ Áy. From
(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤¤) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤¤ j z)) j Á¤¤] = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤¤) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á¤¤ j y)) j Á¤¤]
> Π = (1 ¡ ±)[y(˜ Áy) ¡ U] + ±E[V f
y ('(˜ Áy j y)) j ˜ Áy]
which implies ˜ Áy < Á¤¤ since, for Á 2 [Á¤¤;1],
V f(Á) = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á j y)) j Á]
= (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U] + ±E[V f
y ('(Á j y)) j Á] = V f
y (Á)
given that, when Á 2 [Á¤¤;1],
V f(Á) = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á j y)) j Á]
¸ maxfΠ;(1 ¡ ±)[z(Á) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á j z)) j Á]g
= (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á) ¡ U] + ±E[V f('(Á j z)) j Á]:
39Proof of Lemma 4: (i) By deﬁnition of r
y
t+1;t0(µ), the probability that a worker of type µ will
perform task y for exactly t0 consecutive periods, given that he is assigned task y for the ﬁrst time









































t0 < b¸yt0 ¡ °(Át+1)c ¡ c
y
1 ¡ ::: ¡ c
y
t0¡1g
























































































t0¡1 < b¸yt0¡°(Át+1)c · ¸yt0, so that the inequality








t+1;t0 might be empty (for °(Át+1) high, for






















































t0 ¸ 1. As before, this inequality becomes strict for t0 suﬃciently large. Let t be the smallest
integer such that c
y
1 + ::: + c
y
t < b¸yt ¡ °(Át+1)c, i.e., b¸yt ¡ °(Át+1)c > 0. Since °(Át+1) is ﬁnite





b¸yt ¡ °(Át+1)c, so that C
y
t+1;t¡1 is non-empty, and, for t = t, c
y
1 + ::: + c
y
t < b¸yt ¡ °(Át+1)c, from
which it follows that C
y
t+1;t is non-empty either. Therefore, C
y
t+1;t0 is non-empty for all t0 > t. (ii)
(iii) are straightforward modiﬁcations of the argument in (i).




t¡1) : b¸z¿ ¡ °c ¡ cz
1 ¡ ::: ¡ cz
¿¡1 · cz
¿ < b¸z¿ + °c ¡ cz
1 ¡ ::: ¡ cz
¿¡1;


























= 0, which implies that, as t grows arbitrarily large, the
set Cz





































¿ ¸ b¸y¿ ¡ °(Át+1)c ¡ c
y
1 ¡ ::: ¡ c
y















1 + ::: + c
y
t0¡1 ¸ b¸y(t0 ¡ 1) ¡ °(Át+1)cg, where X
y
t0¡1 denotes the
number of successes in t0 ¡ 1 Bernoulli trials when the probability of success is ®2. By the Law of
Large Numbers for the Bernoulli distribution (see Feller [1965], Ch. 6), we know that, for all " > 0,
limt0!1 PrfX
y
t0¡1(µ) ¸ (t0 ¡1)(®2 +")g = 0. By the same argument as in Proposition 4 under (i),
it is possible to conclude that r
y
t+1;t0(µ) ! 0 as t0 ! 1, while limt0!1 r
y
t+1;t0(µ) > 0. As before,




























from which, together with Proposition 4 under (ii), it follows limt!1 ½t(µ) · limt0!1 r
y
t+1;t0(µ)


























41Proof of Proposition 8: By inspection of V (Á;z) and V (Á;y), it is immediate that, for cy;cz > 0,
Á¤(z) < Á¤(y) and Á¤¤(y) < Á¤¤(z). If y(µ) ¡ cy > Π + U > z(µ) > y(µ) and ± ¸ [Π + U ¡ z(µ) +
cz]=[y(µ)¡z(µ)cz¡cy], it follows Vy(1;y) > Vy(1;z) > Vz(1;z) > Vz(1;y) > Π > Vz(0;z) > Vy(0;z).
Also, Π > Vz(0;y) > Vy(0;y). By monotonicity of V (Á;z) and the fact that Vz(1;z) > Π > Vz(0;z),
it follows that there exists a unique value of the posterior, Á¤(z), which makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent
between employing the worker at z and not hiring him. Similarly, by monotonicity of V (Á;y) and
the fact that Vz(1;y) > Π > Vz(0;y), it follows that there exists a unique value of the posterior,
Á¤(y), for which employing the worker at y is just as proﬁtable as the ﬁrm’s outside option. To
prove that there exists a range of posterior beliefs for which task y is strictly preferred to task z,
for each possible incumbent arm, requires showing
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤(z)) ¡ U] + ±EzV (Á¤(z);z) > (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤(z)) ¡ U ¡ cy] + ±EyV (Á¤(z);y)
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤(y)) ¡ U ¡ cz] + ±EzV (Á¤(y);z) > (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤(y)) ¡ U] + ±EyV (Á¤(y);y):
Notice that, if there exist values of the discount factor for which the inequality holds at Á¤(y), there
must exist values for which it holds at Á¤(z) as well. Consider then Á¤(y). At Á¤(y) either z is more
proﬁtable than y or viceversa. In the ﬁrst case (as well as in the case in which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between the two tasks), V (Á;y) has a kink at Á¤(y). Then, it is strictly convex at Á¤(y). In case,
instead, y is strictly preferred to z at Á¤(y), it follows that V (Á¤(y);y) = Vy(Á¤(y);y). Since Vy is
strictly increasing in Á, Vy('(Á¤(y) j y);y) > Vy('(Á¤(y) j y);y), since Á¤(y) 2 (0;1). Therefore,
even in this case V (Á;y) is strictly convex at Á¤(y). This implies that, for ﬁxed probability of success
at either task, it is always possible to ﬁnd a value of ± suﬃciently large such that at either Á¤(z)
and Á¤(y) task z is strictly preferred to task y. Thus, Á¤(y) < Á¤¤(y) and Á¤(z) < Á¤¤(z) and, by
monotonicity of the diﬀerences Vy(Á;z)¡Vz(Á;z) and Vy(Á;y)¡Vz(Á;y) in Á, these cut-oﬀs values
are uniquely determined. (i) Since cz > 0 and V (Á;y) · V (Á), it is immediate that Á¤ < Á¤(y).
Given V (Á;z) · V (Á), it also follows Á¤ · Á¤(z). Due to the monotonicity of Vy(Á;z) ¡ Vz(Á;z)
and Vy(Á;y) ¡ Vz(Á;y) in Á, Á¤¤(y) < Á¤¤ if and only if at Á¤¤
(1 ¡ ±)y(Á¤¤) + ±EyV (Á¤¤;y) > (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤¤) ¡ cz] + ±EzV (Á¤¤;z):
while Á¤¤ < Á¤¤(z) if and only if at Á¤¤
(1 ¡ ±)z(Á¤¤) + ±EzV (Á¤¤;z) > (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤¤) ¡ cy] + ±EyV (Á¤¤;y):
Then, to show Á¤¤(y) < Á¤¤ < Á¤¤(z) is equivalent to prove
(1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤¤) ¡ z(Á¤¤) + cz] > ±EzV (Á¤¤;z) ¡ ±EyV (Á¤¤;y) > (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤¤) ¡ cy ¡ z(Á¤¤)]: (12)
42By deﬁnition of Á¤¤, ±EzV (Á¤¤) ¡ ±EyV (Á¤¤) = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤¤) ¡ z(Á¤¤)], where ExV (¢) denotes
the expected continuation value at task x 2 fz;yg for the problem without switching costs. If
cy > y(µ) ¡ z(µ), then y(Á¤¤) ¡ cy ¡ z(Á¤¤) < 0. By convexity of V (Á;z) and V (Á;y) and the fact
that the conditional distribution of the updated posterior at z is a mean-preserving spread of the cor-
responding distribution at y (add conditions), the second inequality in (12) holds. Observe that,
if cy is suﬃciently bigger than cz, V (Á;y) > V (Á;z), which in turn implies EzV (Á) ¡ EzV (Á;z) ¸
EyV (Á) ¡ EyV (Á;y). As a result, ±EzV (Á¤¤) ¡ ±EyV (Á¤¤) ¸ ±EzV (Á¤¤;z) ¡ ±EyV (Á¤¤;y), and
thus, for any cz > 0, the ﬁrst inequality in (12) holds as well. (ii) For z not to be proﬁtable in
equilibrium once y is chosen, it must be
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤(y)) ¡ U] + ±EyV (Á¤(y);y) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤(y)) ¡ U ¡ cz] + ±EzV (Á¤(y);z):
or
(1 ¡ ±)cz ¸ (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤(y)) ¡ y(Á¤(y))] + ±EzV (Á¤(y);z) ¡ ±EyV (Á¤(y);y): (13)
Notice that, by deﬁnition of Á¤(y) and the fact that Vz(Á¤(y)) ¸ Vz(Á¤(y);z),
Vz(Á¤(y)) ¡ Π ¸ (1 ¡ ±)[z(Á¤(y)) ¡ y(Á¤(y))] + ±EzV (Á¤(y);z) ¡ ±EyV (Á¤(y);y):
Moreover, since Á¤ < Á¤(y), by monotonicity of Vy(Á) ¡ Vz(Á) and the deﬁnition of Á¤,
(1 ¡ ±)[Π + U ¡ y(µ)] ¸ Π ¡ (1 ¡ ±)[y(Á¤) ¡ U] ¡ ±Π ¸ Π ¡ Vy(Á¤) ¸ Vz(Á¤(y)) ¡ Π
a suﬃcient condition for (13) to hold is cz ¸ Π + U ¡ y(µ).
Proof of Lemma 6: Since EzV (Á1;Á2) is an increasing function of Á1, while the ﬂow proﬁt from
z is a strictly increasing function of Á1, it follows that, for each Á2, there exists a unique value of Á1
for which (5) is satisﬁed. Given that Π > z(µ;µ) = z(µ;µ), it must be maxfΠ;Vy(Á1;z)g > Π for (5)
to hold. The minimal value of Á2 for which (5) holds is for Á2 = 0, with corresponding Á1 = Á¤
z(0).
Since Vz(1;0) = (1 ¡ ±)z(µ;µ) + ±y(µ;µ) > Π for ± > ±, it follows Á¤
z(0) 2 (0;1). Similarly, given
that Vz(0;1) = (1¡±)z(µ;µ)+±Π < Π, the maximal value of Á2 for (5) to hold, Á
2
, must be strictly
bounded away from 1. Note that Vz is a strictly increasing function of Á1 and Á2. Then, as Á2




z(0). Since the maximal increase
in Á2 consistent with (5) is for Á3 = 0, it follows Á¤
z(Á
2
) = 1 ¡ Á
2
2 (0;1). Observe that, since
z(Á1;Á3) = z(µ;µ) ¡ U + Á1[z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ)] ¡ Á3[z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ)]
y(Á1;Á3) = y(µ;µ) ¡ U + Á1[y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ)] ¡ Á3[y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ)]
43and z(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ) and y(µ;µ) > y(µ;µ), V is decreasing in Á3. In particular, Vz is a strictly de-






Proof of Lemma 7: (i) This amounts to showing
Π = (1 ¡ ±)[Á¤
z(Á2)z(µ;µ) + Á2z(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á¤
z(Á2) ¡ Á2)z(µ;µ)] + ±EzV (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2)
> (1 ¡ ±)[Á¤
z(Á2)y(µ;µ) + Á2y(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á¤
z(Á2) ¡ Á2)y(µ;µ)] + ±EyV (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2) (14)
for any given Á2. Notice that V is strictly convex at (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2). This follows from considering
three cases. At (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2) either Vz is greater than Vy or viceversa. Suppose Vz(Á¤
z(Á2);Á2) ¸
Vy(Á¤
z(Á2);Á2). Then, since at (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2) the value function has a kink, it must be strictly con-
vex. Consider now the case Vz(Á¤
z(Á2);Á2) < Vy(Á¤




z(Á2);Á2) and it is strictly greater than Π. But then, since Vy('(Á¤
z(Á2) j y);-
'(Á2 j y)) > Vy('(Á¤
z(Á2) j y);'(Á2 j y)), by strict monotonicity of Vy, it must be EV (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2) >-
V (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2). By strict convexity of V at (Á¤
z(Á2);Á2) and the assumptions on the informativeness
of the signals at z and y, i.e., by Lemma 5, with V convex
EVz(Á1;Á2) ´ EV ('(Á1 j z);'(Á2 j z)) ¸ EV ('(Á1 j y);'(Á2 j z))
¸ EV ('(Á1 j y);'(Á2 j y)) ´ EVy(Á1;Á2)
there always exists a value of ± suﬃciently large for (14) to be satisﬁed. (ii) Observe that, when
Á1 = 1, Vy(1;0) = y(µ;µ)¡U > Vz(1;0) = (1¡±)[z(µ;µ)¡U]+±[y(µ;µ)¡U], while, when Á2 = 1,
Vz(0;1) = (1¡±)[z(µ;µ)¡U]+±Π > Vy(0;1) = (1¡±)[y(µ;µ)¡U]+±Π or, similarly, when Á3 = 1,
Vz(0;0) = (1 ¡ ±)[z(µ;µ) ¡ U] + ±Π > Vy(0;0) = (1 ¡ ±)[y(µ;µ) ¡ U] + ±Π. To show that, for
given Á2 or Á2, there exists at most a unique value of Á1 for which z and y are equally proﬁtable,
it is enough to show that the diﬀerence Vy(Á1;Á2) ¡ Vz(Á1;Á2), for ﬁxed Á2, and the diﬀerence
Vy(Á1;Á3) ¡ Vz(Á1;Á3), for ﬁxed Á3, are increasing in Á1.24 Consider ﬁrst the case in which Á2 is
ﬁxed. Deﬁne the operators Ty and Tz as
Tyf(Á1;Á2) = (1 ¡ ±)[Á1y(µ;µ) + Á2y(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)y(µ;µ)] + ±Eyf(Á1;Á2)
Tzf(Á1;Á2) = (1 ¡ ±)[Á1z(µ;µ) + Á2z(µ;µ) + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)z(µ;µ)] + ±Ezf(Á1;Á2):
Let Uf = maxfΠ;Tyf(Á1;Á2);Tzf(Á1;Á2)g. Consider the diﬀerence
Ty(Uf)¡ Tz(Uf) = [Ty(Uf) ¡ Ty(maxfΠ;Tzfg)]
+ [Tz(maxfΠ;Tyfg) ¡ Tz(Uf)] + [Ty(maxfΠ;Tzfg) ¡ Tz(maxfΠ;Tyfg)] (15)
24Observe that, given the restrictions on payoﬀs, Á
1 has to be suﬃciently high for y to be assigned in equilibrium.
44as a function of Á1. Suppose that, for any real-valued function f on [0;1]2, Tyf ¡ Tzf increasing
in Á1 (for ﬁxed Á2) implies that Ty(Uf) ¡ Tz(Uf) is increasing in Á1 (for ﬁxed Á2). Then, V , the
unique ﬁxed point of U, must be increasing in Á1 (for ﬁxed Á2) as well. Therefore, for the statement
in the Lemma to hold true it is enough to show that each term in (15) is increasing in Á1. Notice
that the diﬀerence in the ﬂow proﬁt from y and z, as a function of Á1, is given by
y(Á1;Á2) ¡ z(Á1;Á2) ´ Á1[y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ) + z(µ;µ)]
+ Á2[y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ) + z(µ;µ)] + y(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ)
and it is monotone increasing in Á1, for given Á2, if y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ). Similarly,
for given Á3, the diﬀerence in ﬂow proﬁt from y and z is
y(Á1;Á3) ¡ z(Á1;Á3) ´ Á1[y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ) + z(µ;µ))]
¡ Á3[y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ) + z(µ;µ)] + y(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ)
which is monotone increasing in Á1, for ﬁxed Á3, if y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ). Since
®2 > ®3, then y(µ;µ) > y(µ;µ), while ¯2 > ¯3 implies z(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ). Then, a suﬃcient condition
for y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ) and y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ) to be satisﬁed is
y(µ;µ) ¡ y(µ;µ) > z(µ;µ) ¡ z(µ;µ). The rest of the argument is an immediate extension of the one
already used in the baseline case to prove that the diﬀerence Vy(Á) ¡ Vz(Á) is increasing in Á.
Proof of Lemma 9: Since







+ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)Π
is an increasing function of Á1, while the ﬂow proﬁt from z is a strictly increasing function of Á1,
it follows that, for each Á2, there exists a unique value of Á1 for which (5) is satisﬁed. Given
that Π > z(µ;µ) = z(µ;µ), it must be maxfΠ; ˜ Vy(˜ Á1)g > Π for (5) to hold. Since Vz(1;0) =
(1 ¡ ±)z(µ;µ) + ±y(µ;µ) > Π for ± >
Π¡z(µ;µ)
y(µ;µ)¡z(µ;µ), the minimal value of Á2 for (5) to hold is Á2 = 0
and it is for Á1 = Á¤
z(0) 2 (0;1). Similarly, given that Vz(0;1) = (1 ¡ ±)z(µ;µ) + ±Π < Π, the
maximal value of Á2 for (5) to hold, Á
2
, must be strictly bounded away from 1. Note that Vz is a
strictly increasing function of Á1 and, for ± suﬃciently large, strictly decreasing of Á2. Consider
@Vz(Á1;Á2)


















Since ˜ Vy(˜ Á1) is continuously diﬀerentiable to the right of Á¤
y and, as noted, ˜ Vy(˜ Á1) > Π, at any such
˜ Á1 for which Π and z are equally proﬁtable, it follows ˜ Vy(x + z) ¸ ˜ Vy(x) + ˜ V 0
y(x) ¢ z, by convexity
45of ˜ Vy. Let x = Á1=(Á1 + Á2) and z = ¡", where " = Á1=(Á1 + Á2) ¡ Á¤
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since ˜ Vy is strictly increasing in ˜ Á1 and ˜ Vy(Á¤
y) = Π, by deﬁnition of Á¤
y, so that @Vz(Á1;Á2)=@Á2 < 0









) = 1 ¡ Á
2
2 (0;1). The rest of the argument follows as in in the proof of Lemma 6.
Proof of Proposition 11: (i) Denote by V i and V j, respectively, the value function of the ﬁrm
employing the worker (ﬁrm i) and not employing him (ﬁrm j) at any given state Á. Notice that,
if the worker’s human capital is general, i.e., fully transferable across ﬁrms, both ﬁrms share a
common belief Á = Ái = Áj, while, if the worker’s human capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, the state is the
common belief vector Á = (Ái;Áj). Let V w be the worker’s value function. From BV’s Lemma 2
(check positive expectation) it is immediate that a wage and job assignment strategy for each
ﬁrm and a worker’s acceptance behavior form an MPE in stationary strategies if and only if
(1 ¡ ±)wi(Á) + ±ExiV w(Á) = (1 ¡ ±)wj(Á) + ±ExjV w(Á) (16)
(1 ¡ ±)[xi(Á) ¡ wi(Á)] + ±ExiV i(Á) ¸ ±ExjV i(Á) (17)
±ExiV j(Á) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)[xj(Á) ¡ wj(Á)] + ±ExjV j(Á) (18)
xi(Á) = argmaxf(1 ¡ ±)zi(Ái) + ±EziV i(Á);(1 ¡ ±)yi(Ái) + ±EyiV i(Á)g ¡ wi(Á) (19)
xj(Á) = argmaxf(1 ¡ ±)zj(Áj) + ±EzjV j(Á);(1 ¡ ±)yj(Áj) + ±EyjV j(Á)g ¡ wj(Á): (20)
Suppose now that the planner selects an employment policy (i.e., the ﬁrm employing the worker at
each state) so as to maximize V w(Á)+V i(Á)+V j(Á), say program (P1), and an assignment policy
so as to maximize V w(Á) + pi(Á)V i(Á) + pj(Á)V j(Á), say (P2), where pi(Á) and pj(Á) indicate,
respectively, the equilibrium probability that the worker is employed at ﬁrm i and j. Express (19)
and (20) as (weak) inequalities. By summing (16), (17) and (18) side by side it is immediate that
ﬁrm i is selected in equilibrium only if it is selected along some optimal path in the planner’s
problem (P1). By summing (16), (19) expressed as weak inequality, weighted by pi(Á), and (20)
expressed as weak inequality, weighted by pj(Á), side by side it also follows that the task proposed
by each ﬁrm is an equilibrium assignment only if it is selected along some optimal path in the
46planner’s problem (P2), i.e., as before the task the worker is assigned maximizes the surplus of the
match. However, the equilibrium task is a solution to program (P1) if and only if the conditions
in the statement are satisﬁed, as it can be easily seen by noticing that
(1 ¡ ±)zi(Ái) + ±EziV i(Á) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)yi(Ái) + ±EyiV i(Á) ? 0
() (1 ¡ ±)zj(Áj) + ±EzjV j(Á) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)yj(Áj) + ±EyjV j(Á) ? 0






x, for x 2 fz;yg, which ensure EziV i ? EyiV i () EzjV j ?
EyjV j, and zj(µ) = azi(µ)+b, yj(µ) = ayi(µ)+b, with a > 0, at each µ, guaranteed by zj = azi+b
and yj = ayi + b, for each zi 2 fz;zg, yi 2 fy;yg.
(ii) The argument closely follows the proof of Theorem 3 in BV. Since the equality in (16) has
to hold in each period, it can be extended using any of the alternatives, either i or j. Extend both
left-hand side and right-hand side of (16) over the continuation game in which ﬁrm j employs the
worker forever. Then,













Note the diﬀerent decoration of Á in the two expressions to emphasize the fact that the associated














Recall that the condition characterizing a cautious equilibrium is that (18) holds as an equality.





±s¡t[xj(˜ Ás) ¡ wj(˜ Ás)]
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±s¡t[xj(˜ Ás) ¡ wj(˜ Ás)]
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47by the linearity of the expectation operator, (check DCT) and the law of iterated expectations.
Finally, to show that the wage policy of the non-employing ﬁrm is a supermartingale, consider
again the cautious equilibrium condition (18), holding as equality. Notice that, conditional on x
j
t
being observed in period t, the condition might turn into an inequality
±(1 ¡ ±)E[xj('(Á j xj)) ¡ wj('(Á j xj))] + ±2Exj;xjV j(Á) ¸ ±2Exi;xjV j(Á)
which can be rewritten, by adding side by side the above and (18), holding as equality (and extended
over the continuation game in which ﬁrm j employs the worker forever), as
±(1 ¡ ±)E[xj('(Á j xj)) ¡ wj('(Á j xj))] + ±2Exj;xjV j(Á) + ±ExiV j(Á) ¸
±2Exi;xjV j(Á) + (1 ¡ ±)[xj(Á) ¡ wj(Á)] + ±ExjV j(Á)
or, equivalently,
±(1 ¡ ±)E[xj('(Á j xj)) ¡ wj('(Á j xj))] + ±2Exj;xjV j(Á)
+±(1 ¡ ±)E[xj('(Á j xi)) ¡ wj('(Á j xi))] + ±2Exi;xjV j(Á) ¸
±2Exi;xjV j(Á) + (1 ¡ ±)[xj(Á) ¡ wj(Á)]
+±(1 ¡ ±)E[xj('(Á j xj)) ¡ wj('(Á j xj))] + ±2Exj;xjV j(Á)
which simpliﬁes to
±E[xj('(Á j xi)) ¡ wj('(Á j xi))] ¸ xj(Á) ¡ wj(Á)
implying wj(Á) ¸ ±Ewj('(Á j xi)) as desired.
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